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INTRODUCTION 
An extension of actions for interference with contractual 
relations, tortious interference with an expected inheritance, 
creates liability for a tortfeasor who intentionally prevents  
another from receiving an inheritance, at-death benefit, or lifetime 
gift. It is rooted in the concept that causes of action such as undue 
influence and fraud, typically brought in the probate courts, may 
be insufficient to provide a disinherited victim with a remedy, and 
premised on the maxim that every wrong should have a remedy.1 
Tortious interference with an expected inheritance or gift, 
though by no means a recently developed cause of action, has 
gained traction since its adoption by the Restatement (Second) of 
 
* Rebecca M. Murphy, Associate Attorney, Pannone Lopes Devereaux & 
O’Gara LLC; J.D., University of Connecticut School of Law, 2010; B.A., 
College of Holy Cross, 2006. Samantha M. Clarke, Associate Attorney, 
Pannone Lopes Devereaux & O’Gara LLC; J.D., Roger Williams University 
School of Law, 2014; B.A., University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 2010. 
1. See Nemeth v. Banhalmi, 425 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); 
Wellin v. Wellin, 135 F. Supp. 3d 502, 516–18 (D.S.C. 2015); see also R.I. 
CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Every person within this state ought to find a certain 
remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which may 
be received in one’s person, property, or character.”). 
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Torts in 1979,2 and has received attention since the highly 
publicized 2006 United States Supreme Court decision in  
Marshall v. Marshall, perhaps better known as the Anna Nicole 
Smith litigation.3 Currently, about half of the states acknowledge 
the tort.4 Many of these states adopt the definition provided by  
the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 774B (1979): 
One who by fraud, duress or other tortious means 
intentionally prevents another from receiving from  a 
third person an inheritance or gift that he would 
otherwise have received is subject to liability to the other 
for loss of the inheritance or gift.5 
However, many of the states that recognize the tort only allow 
a claim of tortious interference where an alternate remedy at law 
(be it through the states’ probate code or otherwise) is unavailable 
or would not provide the injured party with adequate  relief.6  
Thus, in those states tortious interference serves as a surrogate 
claim in situations where a victim is unable to pursue a will 
contest or action against an executor for recovery of wrongfully 
diverted assets.7 
Though the Rhode Island Supreme Court has yet to weigh in, 
the tort was recently considered by the Rhode Island Superior 
Court in Americans United for Life v. Legion of Christ of North 
America, Inc., and determined to be a viable cause of action in 
Rhode Island, albeit with the requirement that plaintiffs first 
exhaust available alternative remedies, such as a will challenge in 
probate court.8 This decision breaks new ground in Rhode Island 
jurisprudence, creating a deterrent for wrongful conduct and, 
consequently, providing greater protections to  vulnerable 
members of the Rhode Island populace. 
This Article will provide a comprehensive overview of tortious 
 
2. Diane J. Klein, The Disappointed Heir’s Revenge, Southern Style: 
Tortious Interference with Expectation of Inheritance—A Survey with  
Analysis of State Approaches in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 55 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 79, 84–85 (2003). 
3. See 547 U.S. 293 (2006). 
4. See infra Part II. 
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B  (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
6. See infra Parts III, IV. 
7. See id. 
8. No. PC-2016-2900, 2017 WL 119569, at *8–9 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 
2017). 
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interference with an expected inheritance. Part I discusses the 
genesis and development of tortious or wrongful interference with 
an expected inheritance. Part II surveys various states’ adoption 
and rejection of the tort. Part III highlights differences in states’ 
approaches to the torts requirements as well as damages available 
to victims, and discusses practical considerations, including 
exhaustion of remedies and when parties may initiate the tort 
action. Part IV discusses the Rhode Island Superior Court’s 
decision in Americans United, whether the tort would be 
recognized by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, and provides 
arguments in favor of rejecting the so-called exhaustion 
requirement as an unnecessary and potentially impossible 
prerequisite to maintaining a tortious interference claim in 
superior court. 
I. GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH AN 
EXPECTED INHERITANCE 
A. Background 
A claim of tortious interference with an expected inheritance 
or gift provides one with the opportunity to recover against a 
tortfeasor for the wrongful deprivation of an expected inheritance, 
benefit under a will, at-death benefit, or inter vivos gift outside of 
probate court.9 The tort developed as a natural extension of other 
common law commercial and non-commercial “interference” torts 
such as interference with contract, interference with prospective 
economic advantage, interference with prospective employment or 
business relations, and interference with gift.10 All of these torts 
are based on wrongful interference with an expectancy, and all 
involve 1) economic loss without physical harm to person or 
property; 2) a claim that is not based on an existing and 
enforceable right or an existing and enforceable contract; and 3) a 
probable prospect of economic gain.11 
Tortious interference is rooted in the concept that traditional 
 
9. Irene D. Johnson, Tortious Interference with Expectancy of 
Inheritance or Gift—Suggestions for Resort to the Tort, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 769, 
770 (2008). 
10. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, HORNBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42.1 (2d   
ed. 2000). 
11. See id.; Allen v. Hall, 974 P.2d 199, 202 (Or. 1999) (en banc). 
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causes of action such as undue influence and fraud, often brought 
in probate court in response to a petition to probate a will, may be 
insufficient to provide a disinherited victim with a remedy, and 
premised on the maxim that every wrong should have a remedy.12 
Diane J. Klein, Professor at University of La Verne College of  
Law, and nationally recognized contributor to tortious  
interference scholarship, explains that “[t]he need for the tort is 
most clearly demonstrated by situations in which the  probate 
court fails by its own standards—that is, when probate  
proceedings cannot fully correct a wrongful attempt to frustrate 
the testator’s desires.”13 
When might probate proceedings lack the ability to remedy 
wrongful attempts to frustrate a testator’s  intentions?  A 
tortfeasor might unduly influence a testator to replace the name of 
one beneficiary with that of the tortfeasor in a will or trust.14 
However, even where a will contest on grounds of undue influence 
is successful and a later executed will is denied probate, there is 
no guarantee that the testator’s intended disposition will take the 
contested will’s place.15 And even if the probate court declined to 
probate the affected provision of the will, it would not restore the 
gift or penalize the tortfeasor.16 Indeed, “[i]f the tortfeasor were a 
residuary beneficiary, he might still benefit.”17 
Also, “[t]he tortfeasor may use undue influence or fraud to 
induce [a] donor to make inter vivos transfers that deplete the 
estate . . . . [Where] the tortfeasor is the personal representative of 
the estate, it is unlikely that the estate will attempt to recapture 
such assets even if this were possible.”18 And, in this situation,  
the personal representative may attempt to impede the victim’s 
efforts  to  restore  wrongfully  transferred  assets.19    Practically 
 
12. See Nemeth v. Banhalmi, 425 N.E.2d 1187, (Ill. App. Ct. 1981);  
Wellin v. Wellin, 135 F. Supp. 3d 502 (D.S.C. 2015). 
13. Diane J. Klein, A Disappointed Yankee in Connecticut (or Nearby) 
Probate Court: Tortious Interference with Expectation of Inheritance—A 
Survey with Analysis of State Approaches in the First, Second, and Third 
Circuits, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 235, 247 (2004). 
14. Id. at 248. 
15. See id. at n.31. 
16. Id. at 248. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. See, e.g., id. at n.32 (quoting Alvin E. Evans, Torts to Expectancies in 
Decedents’ Estates, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 187, 203–04 (1944)) (“Probate may be 
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speaking: 
[D]isappointed heirs may settle for considerably less than 
they are entitled to receive in order to avoid dissipating 
the estate through a lengthy and expensive will contest. 
In these and other situations, a will contest simply does 
not offer the disappointed person a way to obtain the 
intended legacy, and may actually prevent it.20 
Tortious interference is an in personam claim which may 
result in a judgment against the wrongdoer to be paid from 
personal assets, rather than from the testator’s probate estate, 
whereas a will contest is an action in rem which “determines what 
will happen to the assets in the testator’s probate estate.”21 
Because prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, and punitive 
damages (in addition to compensatory damages) are available in 
tort actions, an action alleging tortious interference threatens to 
penalize wrongdoers.22 Therefore, unlike will contests  which, 
some argue, have no deterrent effect, tortious interference serves 
as a powerful deterrent to those who would otherwise engage in 
tortious conduct.23 To fill the vacuum left from  inadequate  
probate procedures, over the decades courts have recognized the 
need to extend the common-law claim for tortious interference  
with a business relation or contract to the context of inheritance 
law.24 
B. Development of the Tort 
Though not officially dubbed tortious interference with an 
expectation of inheritance until the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
in 1979, the concept of obtaining redress for such tortious conduct 
outside of probate court traces its roots back to the nineteenth 
century.25    As  early  as  1855,  the  Supreme  Court  of Louisiana 
 
impossible because the defendant has deprived the plaintiff of the proof 
required to establish a will. This is a wrong involving the plaintiff’s loss of 
evidence and a tort remedy should be available.”). 
20. Id. at 239. 
21. Johnson, supra note 9, at 772. 
22. Id. at 774. 
23. See id. 
24. See infra Part III. 
25. This section addresses the development tort but does not focus on 
which states have expressly adopted it.   For a discussion of the states that 
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recognized that relief could be granted in a case alleging wrongful 
interference in preventing a testator from creating a will.26 In 
Kelly v. Kelly, the decedent’s attending physician had written a 
will for him, which established the decedent’s wife as his sole 
beneficiary.27 The required number of witnesses had been  sent  
for, but left before they witnessed the will.28 After the decedent’s 
death, his widow filed suit against the decedent’s brother and his 
mother, claiming that they prevented the witnesses from signing 
the will by the use of threats and violence.29 The court dismissed 
the widow’s case, citing a lack of evidence that threats and  
violence were actually used, but nonetheless held that “[a]ctions of 
this kind were admissible under the rules of the civil law . . . .”30 
Less than twenty years later, in 1874, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court decided Dowd v. Tucker.31 In Dowd, the decedent 
made a will giving all of her property to her nephew.32 About two 
weeks prior to her death, the decedent expressed her desire to 
bequeath her interest in a house to her niece.33 The niece  
prepared a codicil for the decedent’s signature.34 Before the 
decedent signed the codicil, however, she asked to see her nephew 
first so she could inform him about the property transfer and 
receive his consent.35 In response, the nephew told the decedent 
that she did not need to sign the codicil because she was weak,  
and that he would deed the property to the niece as the decedent 
wanted.36 After the death of the decedent, the niece demanded  
that the nephew deed the decedent’s interest in the property to 
her, but the nephew refused.37 The Supreme Court of Errors 
characterized the nephew’s  actions  as  fraudulent.38  He 
understood  that  the  decedent’s  intention  was  to  bequeath  her 
 
have expressly adopted the tort, see infra Part II. 
26. See Kelly v. Kelly, 10 La. Ann. 622, 622–23 (1855). 
27. Id. at 623. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 622. 
30. Id. 
31. 41 Conn. 197 (1874). 
32. Id. at 204. 
33. Id. at 203–04. 
34. Id. at 202. 
35. Id. at 203–04. 
36. Id. at 205–06. 
37. Id. at 204. 
38. Id. at 203. 
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interest in the property to her niece, and deceptively promised to 
carry out her intention by deeding the property to the niece once 
he received it from the decedent’s estate.39 The court agreed with 
counsel for the niece that the nephew was a constructive trustee of 
the property and that he was “bound in equity and  good  
conscience to make the conveyance.”40 
Courts in the early twentieth century also recognized a need 
to remedy tortious interference with an expected inheritance 
beyond the confines of a will contest in probate court. In 1907, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided Lewis v. Corbin.41 
There, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, the executor and 
residuary legatee, induced the testatrix to execute an invalid 
codicil giving a sum of $5,000 to the plaintiff’s father.42 
Unbeknownst to both the testatrix and the defendant, the 
plaintiff’s father had died before the codicil was executed.43 The 
plaintiff sued the defendant, and the Supreme Judicial Court 
stated that while no action would lie during the life of the 
testatrix, if “the fraud [was] operative up to the time of [the 
testatrix’s] death . . . the fraud directly and proximately caused  
the plaintiff’s loss of his legacy” and the action would lie.44 
However, the Court granted the defendant’s demurrer since “the 
pleading [was] defective in not averring facts which exclude[d]    
the possibility that the testatrix changed her purpose in regard to 
this legacy, and which show[ed] that the  fraud  continued 
operative to the time of her death . . . .”45 
In Barron v. Stuart, the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized 
the concept underpinning tortious interference and imposed a 
constructive trust on the property that was the subject of the 
interference.46 The testator’s son induced the testator to leave all 
of his property to his wife, in his wife’s presence, promising that 
she  would  divide  it  equally  among  the  testator’s  children  and 
 
39. Id. at 203–04. 
40. Id. at 206. 
41. 81 N.E. 248 (Mass. 1907). 
42. Id. at 249. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 250. 
45. Id. This requirement under Massachusetts law that the operative 
fraud “continue” until a testator’s death is explored in greater detail in Part 
III, infra. 
46. 207 S.W. 22, 25 (Ark. 1918). 
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grandchildren.47 After the testator died, his  widow  refused  to 
deed any of the testator’s timberlands to the testator’s daughters 
or divide up the testator’s personal property equally between the 
children.48 The testator’s daughters and grandchildren brought 
suit in equity.49 The court found that the testator’s wife was held 
as a constructive trustee for the intended beneficiaries since she 
was guilty of fraud by acquiescence.50 
In Creek v. Laski, the Michigan Supreme Court found tort 
liability for destruction of a will, thereby defeating its terms.51  
The defendant executrix destroyed a will because of her 
dissatisfaction with its terms and four years later attempted to 
have the destroyed will allowed at probate.52 At that hearing, the 
plaintiff learned that the will bequeathed $2,000 to her, and she 
became a party to the proceeding.53 The probate court denied the 
claimed bequest because the plaintiff only had one witness testify 
to it, and the governing statute required two witnesses.54 The 
plaintiff thereafter brought suit in Michigan Superior Court; she 
alleged malicious and fraudulent destruction of the will, which 
prevented her from proving the gift and therefore defeating her 
legacy.55 The defendant argued that the probate  court decision 
was res judicata of the plaintiff’s right to recover damages from  
the executrix.56 The court disagreed holding that Michigan  
probate courts have “no authority to invade the province of 
common-law courts to award damages for torts, whether in 
connection with wills or otherwise.”57 
It bears noting the significance of the court’s decision in Creek 
in recognizing the limited function of the probate courts.58 Merely 
because an action concerns the execution of or, in that case, the 
destruction of a will does not confine tort victims to the probate 
 
 
47. Id. at 24–25. 
48. Id. at 23. 
49. Id. at 22. 
50. Id. at 25. 
51. 227 N.W. 817, 818–19 (Mich. 1929). 
52. Id. at 818. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 819. 
57. Id. 
58. See id. 
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court forum.59 As Creek recognized, where an action sounds in 
tort, it is the common-law courts that enjoy jurisdiction, ergo the 
need for a cause of action to remedy victims of wrongful 
interference with their inheritances.60 
In Thomas v. Briggs, the plaintiff’s aunt prepared and signed 
a will eight days before her death, leaving her residuary estate in 
equal shares to the plaintiff and the aunt’s husband, the 
defendant.61 After the will was prepared, the aunt asked the 
defendant to have the will witnessed and finished, and the 
defendant promised to do so, but never did.62 Thus, the plaintiff’s 
aunt died intestate.63 The court held that in a constructive trust 
case such as this, “[i]f one party obtains the legal  title  to  
property, . . . by fraud[,] . . . violation of confidence[,] or . . . in any 
other unconscientious manner, . . . equity . . . impress[es] a 
constructive trust upon the property in favor of the one who is in 
good conscience entitled to it.”64  The court continued: 
[W]hen an heir or devisee in a will prevents the testator 
from providing for one for whom he would have provided 
but for the interference of the heir or devisee, such heir or 
devisee will be deemed a trustee, by operation of law, of 
the property, real or personal, received by him from the 
testator’s estate, to the amount or extent that the 
defrauded party would have received had not the 
intention of the deceased been interfered with.65 
The defendant’s interference prevented the decedent from 
providing for the plaintiff, as she would have done, but for the 
interference.66 Therefore, a constructive trust for the plaintiff 
resulted.67 
 
59. See id. 
60. See id.; see also infra Part IV (discussing differences between probate 
court proceedings and actions in superior court when alleging tortious 
interference with an expected inheritance). 
61. 189 N.E. 389, 390 (Ind. Ct. App. 1934) (en banc). 
62. Id. at 391. 
63. Id. at 389, 391. 
64. Id. at 392 (quoting JOHN NORTON POMEROY, JR., POMEROY’S EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES: A TREATISE OF EQUITY 
JURISPRUDENCE § 155 (3d ed.  1905)). 
65. Id. (quoting Ransdel v. Moore, 53 N.E. 767, 771 (Ind. 1899)). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 393. 
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Thomas is illustrative of situations in which, as cautioned by 
Diane Klein, probate courts fail by their own standards.68 The 
will, which contained legitimate bequests the testator expected to 
be probated, was never formally executed, and was thereby 
invalid.69 No probate proceeding, will challenge,  or  otherwise 
could vindicate the plaintiff’s rights.70 Tortious interference, 
however, which does not rely upon the probate or revocation of a 
will, could fill the vacuum left by the probate court and impose 
damages against the tortfeasor’s assets in the amount of money 
that the plaintiff would have received but for the interference, 
thereby making the plaintiff whole.71 
Approximately two years after Thomas, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court recognized tortious interference in Bohannon v. 
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.72 There, the plaintiff alleged that his 
grandmother and aunt had by false representations changed his 
grandfather’s “fixed intention” to leave a large share of his estate 
to the plaintiff.73 Denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the 
court held that the plaintiff’s allegations supported a cause of 
action.74 It reasoned that “[i]f the plaintiff can recover against the 
defendant for the malicious and wrongful interference with the 
making of a contract, we see no good reason why he cannot recover 
for the malicious and wrongful interference with the making of a 
will.”75 The court therefore extended the common law claim of 
tortious interference with a contract to the context of inheritance 
cases: 
Would not a man have the right to receive gifts or 
insurance or the like, if they were in process of being 
perfected, and would have come to him but for malicious 
and fraudulent interference? A bare possibility may not  
be within the reason for this position. But where an 
intending  donor,  or  testator,  or  member  of  a  benefit 
 
68. See id.; Klein, supra note 13, at 247. 
69. See Thomas, 189 N.E. at 391. 
70. See id. at 393. 
71. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ellis, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241 (Ill. 2009) (“The 
‘widely recognized’ tort does not contest the validity of the will; it is  a 
personal action directed at an individual tortfeasor.”). 
72. 188 S.E. 390, 394 (N.C. 1936). 
73. Id. at 393. 
74. Id. at 394. 
75. Id. 
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society, has actually taken steps toward perfecting the 
gift, or devise, or benefit, so that if let alone the right of 
the donee, devisee, or beneficiary will cease to be inchoate 
and become perfect, we are of the opinion that there is 
such a status that an action will lie, if it is maliciously  
and fraudulently destroyed, and the benefit diverted to 
the person so acting, thus occasioning loss to the person 
who would have received it.76 
In 1939, Section 870 of the Restatement (First) of Torts 
foretold the official recognition of the tort, providing that “[a] 
person who does any tortious act for the purpose of causing harm 
to another or to his things or to the pecuniary interests of another 
is  liable  to  the  other  for  such  harm  if  it  results.”77 The 
Restatement further elaborated that “[t]he rule also applies to 
allow recovery where the plaintiff has been prevented from 
receiving a gift from a third person.”78 Finally, in 1979, after 
decades of jurisprudence on the subject, Section 774B of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts formally acknowledged tortious 
interference as a cause of action.79 Section 774B provides: “One 
who by fraud, duress or other tortious means intentionally 
prevents   another   from receiving   from a   third   person  an 
inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have received is 
subject to liability to the other for loss of the inheritance or gift.”80 
Since 1979, many states have recognized tortious 
interference.81  In   2006,   the   United   States Supreme  Court 
identified tortious interference as a “widely recognized tort,”82 
and, while studies vary and commentators disagree, it has been 
 
76. Id. 
77. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 870 (AM. LAW INST. 1939). 
78. Id. § 870 cmt. b. 
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (AM. LAW INST.  1979). 
80. Id. The most recent American Law Reports annotation on  the  
subject identifies five elements of the tort: “[T]he existence of the expectancy; 
that the defendant intentionally interfered with the expectancy; that the 
interference involved tortious conduct such as fraud, duress, or undue 
influence; that there was a reasonable certainty that the plaintiff would have 
received the expectancy but for the defendant’s interference; and 
damages . . . .” Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation, Liability in Damages for 
Interference with Expected Inheritance or Gift, 22 A.L.R. 4th 1229, § 2 (1983). 
81. See infra Part II. 
82. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 312 (2006) (citing King v. Acker, 
725 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex. App. 1987)). 
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estimated that about half of the states have case law recognizing 
the tort.83 
However, it bears noting that tortious interference with an 
expected inheritance is not without its critics. Some legal scholars 
worry that tortious interference is redundant to will contests, for  
it creates a “rival legal regime” for addressing the same problems 
and invites litigation, since tort actions are governed by less 
stringent procedures.84 For example, while a will contest  is  
subject to an onerous standard of proof, tort actions may be proved 
merely by a preponderance of the evidence.85 Another concern 
about the tort is that it corrodes inheritance law, which is founded 
on the principle that property owners have the freedom to dispose 
of their property as they please, and that the American justice 
system should not question the wisdom of such dispositions, nor 
rewrite estate plans posthumously.86 Since  inheritance  law 
centers on effectuating the intentions of the testator, it does not 
provide a would-be-beneficiary with redress for a third party’s 
tortious interference with the expected inheritance.87  On  the 
other hand, critics complain that tortious interference focuses not 
on the testator, but on the allegedly injured would-be-beneficiary, 
thereby undermining the organizing principle of inheritance  
law.88 
Recognizing the potential overlap between tortious 
interference and will contests, many states have adopted a 
requirement  that  litigants  first  pursue  probate  court remedies 
 
83. See Devlin v. United States, 352 F.3d 525, 540 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting 
most states that decided the issue have recognized tortious interference with 
expected inheritance as valid cause of action); John C.P. Goldberg & Robert 
H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying Wrongful Interference with 
Inheritance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 335, 361 (2013) (reporting that tortious 
interference with expected inheritance has now been accepted in twenty-one 
states); Klein, supra note 13, at 240 n.10 (“[J]ust fewer than half of the states 
recognize it, while about a quarter have no reported cases addressing it.”). 
84. See, e.g., Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 338–39. 
85. Johnson, supra note 9, at 773. 
86. See, e.g., Diane J. Klein, Revenge of the Disappointed Heir: Tortious 
Interference with Expectation of Inheritance–A Survey with Analysis of State 
Approaches in the Fourth Circuit, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 259, 270 (2002) (“The 
tort remedy permits a court of general jurisdiction to render judgments that 
redistribute estate assets and undermine the finality of probated wills, albeit 
in substance if not in form.”). 
87. See Johnson, supra note 11, at 772. 
88. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 86, at 271–72. 
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before gaining entrance to non-probate courts. This “exhaustion” 
requirement will be discussed in detail in Parts III and IV. 
II. STATES ADOPTING AND REJECTING THE TORT 
Commentators disagree on the number of states that have 
recognized tortious interference.89 The divergence arises from the 
variety of answers to a basic question: What does it mean for a 
state to have “recognized” the tort? Responses range from 
acknowledgment of tortious interference by the lower courts in one 
state,90 to recognition by an appellate court in another,91 to 
speculation by a federal court deciding state law in yet another.92 
 
89. Compare Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 361–62  
(distinguishing among states where the “court of last resort has recognized 
the tort,” states where “an intermediate appellate court has recognized it,” 
and states where “the viability of the tort is an open question”) and James A. 
Fassold, Tortious Interference with Expectancy of Inheritance: New Tort, New 
Traps, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Jan. 2000, at 26 n.2 (compiling cases and acknowledging 
that states have recognized the tort “to varying degrees”), with Rachel A. Orr, 
Intentional Interference with an Expected Inheritance: The Only Valid 
Expectancy for Arkansas Heirs is to Expect Nothing, 64 ARK. L. REV. 747, 750 
(2011) (“[Tortious interference] is now recognized in twenty-five jurisdictions 
throughout the country.”); Jared S. Renfroe, Does Tennessee Need Another 
Tort? The Disappointed Heir in Tennessee and Tortious Interference with 
Expectancy of Inheritance or Gift, 77 TENN. L. REV. 385, 393 (2010) (“Almost a 
majority of the states recognize the tort.”); Diane J. Klein, “Go West, 
Disappointed Heir”: Tortious Interference with Expectation of Inheritance—A 
Survey with Analysis of State Approaches in the Pacific States, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 209, 210 (2009) (“Twenty-five of the forty-two states that have 
considered [tortious interference] have validated it.”); and  Johnson, supra 
note 9, at 774 (“[A]bout half of all jurisdictions do permit actions based on the 
tort.”). 
90. See Renfroe, supra note 89, at 393, 394 n.89 (including Connecticut as 
a state “recogniz[ing] the tort as a cause of action” based upon two 
Connecticut Superior Court decisions, but acknowledging that a third 
Connecticut Superior Court decision states that Connecticut had not 
recognized tortious interference); see also Klein, supra note 89, at 210 n.3 
(same). 
91. See Renfroe, supra note 89, at 393, 394 n.94 (including Indiana as a 
state “recogniz[ing] the tort as a cause of action” based upon a decision by 
Indiana’s Court of Appeals, its second-highest court); see also Klein, supra 
note 89, at 210 n.3 (citing decision by Indiana’s Court of Appeals, its second- 
highest court, in support of proposition that Indiana is a state that has 
“validated” tortious interference). 
92. See, e.g., Renfroe, supra note 89, at 395 n.108 (quoting Umsted v. 
Umsted, 446 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 2006)) (“We find that Rhode Island would 
adopt the majority position that a cause of action for tortious interference 
with  an  expectancy  of  inheritance . . . would  not  lie  where  an  adequate 
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Employing such broad definitions encourages analysis of the wide 
variety of approaches to tortious interference. However, a broad 
definition can also distort the landscape by inflating the number  
of states whose courts have taken the step of formally recognizing 
the tort.93 In order to avoid the aforementioned problem, this 
Article employs explicit recognition by the highest court in the 
state as its criteria. This distinction is made, not to avoid analysis 
of other states’ examination of the tort, but to appropriately 
distinguish between those states whose pronouncements on 
tortious interference are binding law in their respective 
jurisdictions and those states whose examination of the tort 
remains merely advisory. Moreover, this Article will look closely  
at whether the tort still exists in states where the highest courts’ 
subsequent decisions have meaningfully modified their tortious 
interference jurisprudence. 
A. States Definitively Recognizing Tortious Interference 
Ten states have definitively recognized tortious interference 
through a decision in their court of last resort:94 Florida,95 
Georgia,96  Illinois,97  Iowa,98  Maine,99  Massachusetts,100 North 
 
statutory remedy is available but has not been pursued.”). 
93. Klein, supra note 13, at 252 (“Strictly speaking . . . a state should  
only be said to ‘recognize’ the tort if the state court of last resort (typically 
called the supreme court) has said it does.”). 
94. In setting the number of states that have adopted tortious 
interference at ten, this Article reaches a different conclusion even from 
commentators who distinguish between states that have adopted tortious 
interference by decisions of their highest court and states where the tort has 
merely been acknowledged by lower courts. See, e.g., Goldberg & Sitkoff, 
supra note 83, at 361 (“In eleven states, the court of last resort has recognized 
the tort . . . .” (emphasis added)). This distinction lies in the narrow criteria 
for adoption employed in this Article, requiring a decision by a state’s court of 
last resort without any subsequent decision modifying the prior holding in a 
meaningful way. Specifically, the authors disagree about whether Kentucky 
still recognizes tortious interference. 
95. DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So. 2d 216, 218 (Fla. 1981) (“[A] cause of action 
for wrongful interference with a testamentary expectancy has been 
recognized in this state . . . .”); see also Klein, supra note 2, at 109–21 
(discussing Florida’s “extremely well-developed body of law” on tortious 
interference). 
96. Mitchell v. Langley, 85 S.E. 1050, 1053 (Ga. 1915) (“[W]here an 
intending donor, or testator, or member of a benefit society, has actually   
taken steps toward perfecting the gift, or devise, or benefit, so that if let alone 
the right of the donee, devisee, or beneficiary will cease to be inchoate and 
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become perfect, we are of the opinion that there is such a status that an 
action will lie, if it is maliciously and fraudulently destroyed, and the benefit 
diverted to the person so acting, thus occasioning loss to the person who  
would have received it.”); see also Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, 
Inc. v. Ichthus Cmty. Tr., 780 S.E.2d 311, 319 (Ga. 2015)  (“Georgia’s 
appellate courts have recognized a cause of action for interference with an 
economic expectancy in the form of a gift within the context of receiving an 
inheritance or otherwise receiving a benefit upon the death of another . . . .”); 
Morgan v. Morgan, 347 S.E.2d 595, 595–96 (Ga. 1985) (reiterating Mitchell 
holding); Renfroe, supra note 89, at 130 n.11 (citing Mitchell as recognizing 
tort); Klein, supra note 2, at 121 (“Georgia was one of the very first states to 
recognize the tort.”). 
97. In re Estate of Ellis, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241 (Ill. 2009) (acknowledging 
tort and describing its elements); Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 361 & 
n.175 (citing In re Estate of Ellis as recognizing tort); but see Robinson v.   
First State Bank of Monticello, 454 N.E.2d 288, 294 (Ill. 1983) (“In this case, 
where a will has been admitted to probate and where the plaintiffs have 
engaged an attorney to determine whether they should file a will contest, 
have decided not to contest the will, have entered into a  settlement 
agreement for $125,000 (agreeing to release the other parties to the 
agreement including defendant . . . from any and all claims and causes of 
action arising from any will, codicil or other undertaking by the parties), and 
have allowed the statutorily prescribed period in which to contest the will to 
expire (thereby establishing the validity of the will), we will not recognize a 
tort action for intentional interference with inheritance.”); Jason L. 
Hortenstine, The Tortious Loss of Expectancies, a Lost Opportunity for 
Deterrence, and the Light at the End of the Tunnel, 37 S. ILL. U. L.J. 741, 741 
(2013) (“In Illinois, courts recognize the tort as a last recourse, not as a 
separate course of action.”). For purposes of this Article, it is apparent that 
the state’s highest court has, at minimum, recognized the tort. See In re  
Estate of Ellis, 923 N.E.2d at 241; Robinson, 454 N.E.2d at 293–94. 
98. Frohwein v. Haesemeyer, 264 N.W.2d 792, 795 (Iowa 1978) (“[W]e   
are persuaded that an independent cause of action for the wrongful 
interference with a bequest does exist, recognizing as we do the difficulties 
attendant to recovery in such an action.”); see also Huffey v. Lea, 491 N.W.2d 
518, 520 (Iowa 1992) (citing Frohwein as recognizing tort); Goldberg  & 
Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 361 & n.175 (citing both Huffey and Frohwein as 
recognizing tort). 
99. Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013, 1018 (Me. 1979) (“[U]nder appropriate 
circumstances Maine recognizes an action for the wrongful interference with 
an expected legacy or gift under a will.”); Klein, supra note 2, at 253 (“Maine 
first recognized the tort in the 1979 case of Cyr v. Cote.”); see also Plimpton v. 
Gerrard, 668 A.2d 882, 885 (Me. 1995) (citing Cyr as recognizing tort); 
DesMarais v. Desjardins, 664 A.2d 840, 843 (Me. 1995) (same); Harmon v. 
Harmon, 404 A.2d 1020, 1022 (Me. 1979) (same). 
100. Lewis v. Corbin, 81 N.E. 248, 250 (Mass. 1907) (acknowledging that 
defendant’s fraudulent conduct in inducing testatrix to execute codicil to her 
will, and thereby depriving plaintiff of legacy under testatrix’s will, 
constituted “actionable wrong”); see also Labonte v. Giordano, 687 N.E.2d 
1253, 1255 (Mass. 1997) (“[W]e have long recognized a cause of action for 
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Carolina,101 Ohio,102 Oregon,103 and West Virginia.104 In each of 
these states, (1) the highest court has definitively recognized 
tortious interference, in some cases nearly a century ago; and (2) 
those decisions remain binding authority on which lower courts in 
 
tortious interference with the expectancy of receiving a gift in certain limited 
conditions.”); Monach v. Koslowski, 78 N.E.2d 4, 7 (Mass. 1948) (recognizing   
a sufficient cause of action for tortious interference with expected 
inheritance); Klein, supra note 13, at 264 (“Massachusetts was one of the first 
states to recognize the tort . . . .”). 
101. Bohannon v. Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co., 188 S.E. 390, 394 (N.C. 1936) 
(“If the plaintiff can recover against the defendant for the malicious and 
wrongful interference with the making of a contract, we see no good reason 
why he cannot recover for the malicious and wrongful interference with the 
making of a will.”); Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 356–57, 366 
(discussing North Carolina’s recognition of tortious interference with  
expected inheritance and later acknowledging Bohannan as  “perhaps  the 
first case formally to recognize” the tort); Klein, supra note 86, at 273 (“North 
Carolina was one of the first states in the entire United States to recognize 
[the] tort.”); see also Dulin v. Bailey, 90 S.E. 689, 690 (N.C. 1916) (allowing 
plaintiff to proceed with tort action against individuals who destroyed 
subsequent will that would have left plaintiff a legacy in testator’s estate in 
order to probate prior will); but see Holt v. Holt, 61 S.E.2d 448, 451 (N.C.  
1950) (“[A] child has no standing at law or in equity either before or after the 
death of his parent to attack a conveyance by the parent as being without 
consideration, or in deprivation of his right of inheritance.”). 
102. Firestone v. Galbreath, 616 N.E.2d 202, 203 (Ohio 1993) (citing 
Morton v. Petitt, 177 N.E. 591, 592–93 (Ohio 1931)) (responding  in 
affirmative to certified question from United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit as to whether Ohio recognizes tortious interference with 
expectancy of inheritance); see also Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 361 
& n.175 (citing Firestone as recognizing tort). 
103. Allen v. Hall, 974 P.2d 199, 206 (Or. 1999) (en banc) (“[T]here is no 
need, in the case before us, to decide in the abstract whether to recognize a 
separate and distinct claim for intentional interference with prospective 
inheritance in this state. We hold that the complaint in the present case 
states a claim under a reasonable extension of the scope of the tort of 
intentional interference with economic relations.”); see also Goldberg & 
Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 361 & n.175 (citing Allen as recognizing tort); Klein, 
supra note 89, at 214–15 (quoting Allen, 974 P.2d at 206) (“[T]he Oregon 
Supreme Court expressly validated a cause of action for interference with 
expectation of inheritance, albeit not as ‘a separate and distinct claim,’ but 
rather ‘under a reasonable extension of the scope of the tort of intentional 
interference with economic relations.’”). 
104. Barone v. Barone, 294 S.E.2d 260, 264 (W. Va. 1982) (“We find 
tortious interference with a testamentary bequest to be a tort in West 
Virginia.”); Klein, supra note 13, at 282 (“West Virginia recognizes the tort 
and permits broad access to it.”); see also Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 
763 (W. Va. 1998) (citing Barone as recognizing tort); Calacino v. 
McCutcheon, 356 S.E.2d 23, 25–26 (W. Va. 1987) (same). 
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those jurisdictions still rely. However, this is a two-part 
requirement for a reason: While more than ten states’ highest 
courts have examined the question of whether to adopt tortious 
interference, the tort has not always survived as a viable cause of 
action in the years that followed those initial decisions. For 
example, in Kentucky,105 Idaho,106 and Delaware,107 the court of 
last resort appeared to favor recognition of tortious interference, 
but later cases strongly suggest that those earlier decisions are no 
longer good law. 
From the foregoing analysis, it is apparent that only a few 
states recognize, in decisions that are binding authority within 
their jurisdiction, a cause of action for tortious interference. It is 
useful to distinguish and separately note these states, because 
their decisions on tortious interference should ring with greater 
force in any analysis of the tort. Cases from those jurisdictions 
represent seasoned authority on the subject of tortious 
interference.  Several of these states have recognized the tort for 
 
105. See Allen v. Lovell’s Adm’x, 197 S.W.2d 424, 426–27 (Ky. 1946) 
(recognizing a tort action for wrongful destruction of a will); but see Simmons 
v. Simmons, No. 2012-CA-000383-MR, 2013 WL 3369421, at *23 (Ky. Ct.   
App. July 5, 2013) (“We agree that while Kentucky has never overtly 
recognized and adopted this cause of action, neither has it been rejected.”). 
106. See Carter v. Carter, 146 P.3d 639, 647 (Idaho 2006) (adopting trial 
court’s analysis of tortious interference in its review on appeal and appearing 
to treat the tort as a viable cause of action); but see Losser v. Bradstreet, 183 
P.3d 758, 764 (Idaho 2008) (discussing tortious interference in a manner 
indicating the tort has not yet been recognized in Idaho, and thereafter 
stating that it would assume, “without deciding, that this Court would 
recognize the tort of interference with inheritance”)  (emphasis  added); see 
also Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 361 n.176. 
107. See Chambers v. Kane, 424 A.2d 311, 316 (Del. Ch. 1980) 
(acknowledging the potential for, but “pass[ing] no judgment on whether or 
not plaintiff may have a present cause of action, in tort, for the recovery of 
money damages against her brother for his alleged tortious interference with 
her expectation of receiving an inheritance from her mother”), aff’d in 
pertinent part by 437 A.2d 163, 164 (Del. 1981) (“[T]o the extent that plaintiff 
seeks an independent or personal judgment against her brother on the basis 
of the allegations in the complaint, we are satisfied that the Vice Chancellor 
made the correct ruling and, to that extent, the judgment will be affirmed.”); 
but see Moore v. Graybeal, 550 A.2d 35, 35 (Del. 1988) (order) (“We agree with 
the Superior Court, and the federal courts which have considered the issue, 
that appellants’ claim of tortious interference with an inheritance if pursued 
in a court of law would constitute a collateral attack upon the probate of the 
will of [decedent]. Such an attack is clearly precluded by Delaware law.”); 
Klein, supra note 2, at 286–91. 
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many years:108  Florida, with its “extremely well-developed body  
of law” on tortious interference,109 has cases dating back over fifty 
years,110 and Maine, with cases dating back at least thirty-eight 
years, boasts a whopping nine Supreme Judicial Court decisions 
concerning the tort.111 However, even those states’ bodies of case 
law on tortious interference are relatively young compared to 
North Carolina (over eighty years),112 Georgia (over one hundred 
years),113 and Massachusetts (over one hundred and ten years).114 
In short, while the ten states whose highest courts have 
definitively recognized the tort are not the sum total of authority 
on tortious interference, their decisions carry considerable weight 
in this Article’s examination of the tort. 
B. States Acknowledging Without Explicitly Adopting the Tort 
Another seventeen states, along with the District  of 
Columbia, have not been silent on tortious interference: 
California,115 Connecticut,116 Delaware,117 Idaho,118  Indiana,119 
 
108. Accord Orr, supra note 89, at 750 (“The tort of intentional 
interference with an expected inheritance has a history that spans more than 
one hundred years in the United States court system.”); but see Goldberg & 
Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 355 (“As late as 1979, there was little recognition in 
American law of wrongful interference with inheritance as a tort.”). 
109. Klein, supra note 2, at 109. 
110. See Allen, 197 S.W.2d at 424. 
111. Klein, supra note 13, at 253. 
112. See Bohannon v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 188 S.E. 390, 394  
(N.C. 1936). 
113. See Mitchell v. Langley, 85 S.E. 1050, 1053 (Ga. 1915). 
114. See Lewis v. Corbin, 81 N.E. 248, 250 (Mass. 1907). 
115. See Beckwith v. Dahl, 141 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 155–57 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2012) (recognizing intentional interference with expectation of inheritance as 
a valid cause of action); but see In re Estate of Trevillian, Nos. B187871, 
B188103, 2008 WL 175933, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2008) (“The tort of 
interference with the right to inherit has not been recognized in California.”); 
Klein, supra note 89, at 220–28 (including California in analysis of “Pacific 
states [that] have declined to recognize the tort”). 
116. See Bria v. Saumell, No. 26 84 56, 1990 WL 271047, at *2 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. May 29, 1990) (indicating that “[t]here is authority for the 
proposition that the plaintiffs have the right to maintain an action for 
damages”) (citing Liability for Damages for Interference with Expected 
Inheritance or Gift, 22 A.L.R 4th 1229, §§ 4, 6(a)); but see Troy v. Folger, No. 
CV 970161947S, 1998 WL 252355, at *1–2 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 8, 1998) 
(granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss a count for “interference with 
prospective advantage” premised upon the defendant’s interference with the 
plaintiffs’  expectation  of  an  inheritance  from  their  father);  see  also Klein, 
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Kentucky,120 Louisiana,121 Michigan,122 Minnesota,123 
 
supra note 13, at 271–73. Federal courts have offered similarly contradictory 
opinions on whether Connecticut recognizes tortious interference. Compare 
Devlin v. United States, 352 F.3d 525, 542 (2d Cir. 2003)  (“Connecticut  
follows the majority of jurisdictions . . . in recognizing the tort of interference 
with an inheritance.”), with DiMaria v. Silvester, 89 F. Supp. 2d 195, 196 n.2 
(D. Conn. 1999) (concluding that “Connecticut does not recognize a cause of 
action for the intentional interference with an inheritance”). 
117. See Klein, supra note 13, at 286–91; see also Chambers v. Kane, 424 
A.2d 311, 316 (Del. Ch. 1980), aff’d in pertinent part by 437 A.2d at 164; but 
see Moore v. Graybeal, 550 A.2d 35, 35 (Del. 1988) (order). 
118. See Diane J. Klein, River Deep, Mountain High, Heir Disappointed: 
Tortious Interference with Expectation of Inheritance—A Survey with  
Analysis of State Approaches in the Mountain States, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 7–8 
(2008–2009) (“The Idaho Supreme Court has addressed tortious interference 
with expectation of inheritance twice in just the past few years. While the 
first case seems clearly to recognize it, the second casts some doubt on that 
holding.”); Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 361 n.176; see also Carter v. 
Carter, 146 P.3d 639, 647 (Idaho 2006); but see Losser v. Bradstreet, 183 P.3d 
758, 764 (Idaho 2008). 
119. See Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160, 162 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) 
(adopting tortious interference with the limitation that parties are prohibited 
from bringing the tort “where the remedy of a will contest is available and 
would provide the injured party with adequate relief”); see also Carlson v. 
Warren, 878 N.E.2d 844, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“To prevail on a claim of 
tortious interference with an inheritance, [the plaintiffs] must show that the 
[defendants] intentionally prevented them, by using fraud or other tortious 
means, from receiving an inheritance from [the decedent] that they otherwise 
would have received.”). 
120. Allen v. Lovell’s Adm’x, 197 S.W.2d 424, 426–27 (Ky. 1946); Simmons v. 
Simmons, No. 2012-CA-000383-MR, 2013 WL 3369421, at *23 
(Ky. Ct. App. July 5, 2013). 
121. Kelly v. Kelly, 10 La. Ann. 622, 622 (1855) (acknowledging possibility 
of claim very similar to tortious interference that would permit a plaintiff to 
obtain damages from defendants, where defendants allegedly “prevented 
[decedent] by their threats and violence from instituting [plaintiff as 
decedent’s] universal legatee”); see also Klein, supra note 2, at 105–09 (“No 
Louisiana state court in the past century and a half has explicitly addressed 
whether to recognize the tort of intentional interference with expectation of 
inheritance as such[.]”) (emphasis added). McGregor v. McGregor, 101 F. 
Supp. 848 (D. Colo. 1951), a federal case, is also occasionally cited as a case 
establishing that Louisiana recognizes tortious interference. See Goldberg & 
Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 362 n.185 (stating that while McGregor “fail[s] to 
state whether [it is] applying Colorado or Louisiana law,” the case does 
declare that “courts generally approve of the tort”); but see Klein, supra note 
2, at 108 (discussing the same, but concluding “[i]t is more logical to assume 
that Louisiana law is being applied throughout”). 
122. See Estate of Doyle v. Doyle, 442 N.W.2d 642, 643 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1989) (acknowledging that plaintiff had standing to bring claims against 
defendants  who  allegedly,  through  undue  influence,  interfered  with  the 
1_MURPHY&CLARKE_FINAL EDIT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/17 6:21 AM 
 
 
 
 
550 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:531 
 
Missouri,124    New    Jersey,125    New    Mexico,126  Pennsylvania,127 
 
decedent’s testamentary plan to divide her estate equally between her two 
children: the plaintiff and one of the defendants) (citing Harmon v. Harmon, 
404 A.2d 1020 (Me. 1979)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (AM. LAW 
INST. 1979); Liability in Damages for Interference with Expected Inheritance 
or Gift, 22 A.L.R. 4th 1229). 
123. See Botcher v. Botcher, No. CX-00-1287, 2001 WL 96147, at  *6 
(Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2001) (observing that creating new torts is a function 
of the highest court and further declining to recognize tortious interference 
where the remedies available to the appellant under the probate code were 
“adequate to protect any interest he has in [the decedent’s] estate”). 
124. See Hammons v. Eisert, 745 S.W.2d 253, 256–58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) 
(examining authority concerning tortious interference and ultimately 
recognizing the tort by acknowledging that a trust beneficiary has a valid 
cause of action against a tortfeasor who induces a settlor to revoke the trust, 
and in so doing, diverts trust funds and prevents the beneficiary, “from 
receiving that which he would otherwise have received”); see also Commerce 
Bank, N.A. v. Blasdel, 141 S.W.3d 434, 452 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (“Actions for 
tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance or gift under § 774B were 
first recognized as viable in Missouri in Hammons v. Eisert, 745 S.W.2d 253 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988).”). 
125. See Garruto v. Cannici, 936 A.2d 1015, 1018 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2007) (“[A]lthough an independent cause of action for tortious 
interference with an expected inheritance may be recognized in other 
circumstances, it is barred when, as here, plaintiffs have failed to pursue 
their adequate remedy in probate proceedings of which they received timely 
notice.”); see also Casternovia v. Casternovia, 197 A.2d 406, 409 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1964) (acknowledging that at that time, there was “no reported 
decision in [New Jersey] wherein damages were sought to be recovered in a 
tort action for malicious interference with an expected gift” but opening door 
to possibility of cause of action); Klein, supra note 13, at 273–74 (“A single 
New Jersey appellate case appears to recognize the tort, in dicta, although   
not if the donor is still alive.”). 
126. See Doughty v. Morris, 871 P.2d 380, 383 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) 
(“Today, we extend the line of New Mexico cases acknowledging tortious 
interference causes of action to include a cause of action against those who 
intentionally and tortiously interfere with an expected inheritance.”); see also 
Peralta v. Peralta, 131 P.3d 81, 82 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005); Klein, supra note 
119, at 11 (“Although the Supreme Court of New Mexico has yet to address 
the tort, three New Mexico Court of Appeals cases have recognized it and 
begun to develop a state jurisprudence on the tort.”). 
127. See Cardenas v. Schober, 783 A.2d 317, 325 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) 
(asserting that Pennsylvania permits an action for tortious interference) 
(citing Marshall v. De Haven, 58 A. 141, 142 (Pa. 1904) (concluding that no 
cause of action lay where plaintiff failed to alleged that purported tortfeasor 
“was to, or did, use any fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence; that he 
was successful in preventing any change [to the will]; that but for him the 
testator would have changed his will, or that if the testator had done so what 
he would have given to the plaintiff”)); see also McNeil v. Jordan, 814 A.2d 
234,  238  (Pa.  Super.  Ct.  2002)  (acknowledging  tortious  interference  in  a 
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Rhode Island,128 Texas,129 Wisconsin,130 and the District of 
Columbia131 offer lower court and appellate court decisions 
examining and even outright embracing the tort, and decisions 
from courts of last resort that simply discuss the tort while 
declining to explicitly adopt it. The temptation may be to draw 
expansive conclusions about the state of tortious interference from 
the decisions in these jurisdictions, but it is a messy landscape 
that does not lend itself to neatly packaged principles of law. As 
will be addressed in Part III, there are distinctions even among 
courts in the same state as to the proper approach to tortious 
interference. These lingering disagreements have a troubling 
result in jurisdictions without a decision by the highest court: 
many  aspects  of  the  tort,  including  the  elements  of  tortious 
 
manner similar to Cardenas), rev’d on other grounds, 894 A.2d 1260, 1262   
(Pa. 2006) (discussing pre-complaint discovery procedures and, notably, not 
rejecting tortious interference); Klein, supra note 13, at 275 (describing the 
sole Pennsylvania cases to recognize the tort as lower court cases). 
128. See Ams. United for Life v. The Legion of Christ of N. Am., Inc., C.A. 
No. PC-2016-2900, slip op. at 23 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2017) (holding that 
“tortious interference with expectation of inheritance is a cognizable claim 
under Rhode Island law”). The United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit has also projected that the Rhode Island Supreme Court will 
recognize the tort. See Umsted v. Umsted, 446 F.3d  17, 22  (1st Cir. 2006) 
(“We find that Rhode Island would adopt the majority position that a cause of 
action for tortious interference with an expectancy of inheritance, if it lies at 
all, would not lie where an adequate statutory remedy is available but has   
not been pursued.”); Klein, supra note 13, at 292–93. 
129. Compare King v. Acker, 725 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex. App. 1987) (“We 
hold that a cause of action for tortious interference with inheritance rights 
exists in Texas.”), with Anderson v. Archer, 490 S.W.3d 175, 177 (Tex. App. 
2016) (observing that neither the Texas Supreme Court nor the state 
legislature has recognized the tort, and therefore declining to recognize the 
tort at the intermediate appellate level). See also Klein, supra note 2, at 97 
(“Texas appellate courts recognize the tort . . . although the Texas Supreme 
Court has yet to address it.”). 
130. See Harris v. Kritzik, 480 N.W.2d 514, 518 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) 
(adopting Restatement formulation of tortious interference and  concluding 
that the complaint failed “to state a basis for which relief can be granted for 
intentional or malicious interference with [an] expected inheritance”). 
131. See In re Ingersoll Trust, 950 A.2d 672, 699–700 (D.C. 2008) 
(analyzing tortious interference claim without deciding whether D.C. 
recognizes the tort and concluding that claimant failed to “satisfy[y] her 
burden as to all of the elements of that tort”); see also In re Estate of Reilly, 
933 A.2d 830, 834 (D.C. 2007) (recounting without comment lower court 
decision, which held that “the District of Columbia does not recognize the tort 
of intentional interference with inheritance”). 
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interference, courts with jurisdiction over the cause of action, and 
whether probate remedies must be exhausted before pursing it, 
remain open questions. Accordingly, while this Article will draw 
from the foregoing body of law, it will do so with great caution. 
C. States Declining to Recognize the Tort 
With tortious interference on their dockets, the highest courts 
in nine states have declined to recognize tortious interference: 
Alabama,132 Arkansas,133 Kansas,134 Maryland,135 Montana,136 
 
 
132. See Ex parte Batchelor, 803 So. 2d 515, 515 (Ala. 2001) (following 
rehearing, withdrawing earlier opinion recognizing tortious interference). In  
a case predating Batchelor, the Alabama Supreme Court had analyzed 
tortious interference and noted the court had “not addressed the proposed 
cause of action” before, but it concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a 
claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Holt v. First Nat. Bank of 
Mobile, 418 So. 2d 77, 79 (Ala. 1982). See also Klein, supra note 2, at 131   
(“As matters currently stand . . . the tort is not recognized, although it has 
substantial support from Alabama’s highest court.”). 
133. See Jackson v. Kelly, 44 S.W.3d 328, 328 (Ark. 2001) (“We decline to 
recognize the tort in this case because the appellant’s remedy in  probate  
court would have been adequate had she prevailed in her will contest.”); see 
also Fenton v. Pearson, No. CA03-1122, 2004 WL 2101994, at *2 (Ark. Ct. 
App. Sept. 22, 2004) (acknowledging that Arkansas “has yet to decide” 
whether to adopt tortious interference, but determining that “even  if  the 
cause of action were recognized, appellant could not prove an essential 
element” thereof); Orr, supra note 89, at 747 (“To date, the Arkansas 
legislature and Arkansas courts have not seen fit to recognize the tort of 
intentional interference with an expected inheritance.”). 
134. See Axe v. Wilson, 96 P.2d 880, 888 (Kan. 1939) (concluding that the 
plaintiff’s action for damages, premised on “malicious interference with her 
alleged right of inheritance,” would negate the effect of the operative will— 
just as in a will contest—and as a result, holding that “remedy to obtain the 
particular relief sought does not lie in an action for damages, but in her   
action to contest the will”); but see Miller v. Woodmen Acc. & Life Ins. Co., 
961 P.2d 71 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) (unpublished) (“[N]o such tort has been 
previously recognized, [but] this cause of action has not been precluded when 
the claimant has no other method by which to recover damages for undue 
influence.”). 
135. Anderson v. Meadowcroft, 661 A.2d 726, 728 (Md. 1995) (observing 
that Maryland has “not yet considered expanding the tort to apply to 
interference with gifts or bequests” and ultimately electing not to opine on 
whether to “embrace” tortious interference because plaintiff failed to 
adequately allege underlying tortious conduct of undue influence); Geduldig 
v. Posner, 743 A.2d 247, 256 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (observing that the 
“Court of Appeals neither accepted nor rejected the tort and expressly stated 
that it did not need to decide that issue because the complaint did not 
adequately allege undue influence, the underlying alleged misconduct,” and 
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Nebraska,137 New York,138 South Carolina,139 Tennessee,140 and 
Virginia.141 In addition, the intermediate appellate courts in 
Washington142 and Hawaii143 have declined to recognize the  tort. 
 
concluding that while circumstances may exist under which the Court of 
Appeals would recognize tortious interference, no such circumstances existed 
on the facts presented); see also Klein, supra note 86, at 284–91 (“Although 
the Maryland courts seem[] sympathetic to the tort in principle, none has yet 
encountered a factual situation warranting relief, and all have so far declined 
to recognize it.”) (footnote omitted). 
136. Hauck v. Seright, 964 P.2d 749, 753 (Mont. 1998) (discussing tortious 
interference and concluding that the facts as presented did not require the 
court to “address whether tortious interference with an expectancy will be 
recognized as a cause of action in Montana.”); see Klein, supra note 119, at 18 
(discussing Montana’s decision to decline recognition of the tort). 
137. Litherland v. Jurgens, 869 N.W.2d 92, 96 (Neb. 2015) (declining to 
adopt the tort of intentional interference with an inheritance, noting that 
claimant had adequate probate remedies). 
138. Vogt v. Witmeyer, 665 N.E.2d 189, 190 (N.Y. 1996) (“New York, 
however, has not recognized a right of action for tortious interference with 
prospective inheritance[.]”) (citing Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill 104, 110 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1845)); O’Sullivan v. Hallock, 101 A.D.3d 1313, 1314 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2012) (“New York does not recognize a cause of action for  tortious 
interference with prospective inheritance[.]”); see Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra 
note 83, at 355–56 (discussing Hutchins and New York’s dismissal of tort 
claim); see also Klein, supra note 13, at 282 (stating the New York has 
“explicitly rejected the tort”). 
139. Malloy v. Thompson, 762 S.E.2d 690, 692 (S.C. 2014) (“[T]his opinion 
must not be understood as either adopting or rejecting the tort of intentional 
interference with inheritance.”); Douglass ex rel. Louthian v. Boyce, 542 
S.E.2d 715, 717 (S.C. 2001) (“We have not adopted the tort of intentional 
interference with inheritance[.]”); see Klein, supra note 86, at 291 (observing 
that South Carolina does not recognize tortious interference). 
140. Stewart v. Sewell, 215 S.W.3d 815, 827 (Tenn. 2007) (observing that 
Tennessee does not recognize tortious interference); see generally Fell v. 
Rambo, 36 S.W.3d 837, 850 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (“We decline to use this 
case to determine whether Tennessee should adopt the tort of interference 
with inheritance or gift.”); Renfroe, supra note 89, at 386–406. 
141. Economopoulos v. Kolaitis, 528 S.E.2d 714, 720 (Va. 2000) (“We also 
agree with the trial court that a cause of action for ‘tortious interference with 
inheritance’ is not recognized in Virginia.”); Carter v. Wyczalkowski, 79 Va. 
Cir. 599 (2009) (citing Economopoulos, 528 S.E.2d at 720) (“Virginia does not 
recognize a cause of action for tortious interference with an inheritance.”); 
Klein, supra note 86, at 292 (observing that Virginia “does not recognize a 
cause of action for tortious interference with inheritance.”). 
142. In re Estate of Hendrix, 134 Wash. App. 1007 (2006) (declining to 
recognize tortious interference on the facts presented); Hadley v. Cowan, 804 
P.2d 1271, 1274, 1276 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing interference claims 
but acknowledging they were barred by res judicata following settlement in a 
preceding will contest); see Klein, supra note 89, at 228–31 (“[I]n 2006, the 
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Notably, these cases do not, for the most part, represent wholesale 
rejection of tortious interference. Instead, they have “declined to 
recognize the tort on the facts presented rather than categorically 
rejecting it . . . .”144 Unfortunately, this  has  left  commentators 
and courts in disagreement as to the appropriate treatment of 
these cases.145 For instance, the United States Court of Appeals  
for the First Circuit highlighted an Arkansas Supreme Court case 
in support of its conclusion that most courts addressing tortious 
interference have declined to recognize the tort where the  
claimant failed to first pursue an adequate probate remedy.146  
One is left to wonder whether it is fair to say that Arkansas 
actually recognizes tortious interference based on its decision in 
Jackson v. Kelly, or whether the case simply indicates that 
Arkansas has not, in fact, adopted the tort—rendering its 
pronouncements on the prerequisites for suit little better than 
dicta.147 Broad pronouncements about the nature of tortious 
interference can blur these issues. 
Not every state requires a magnifying glass to discern its 
intentions with respect to tortious interference. Three states 
employ comparably strong language in rejecting tortious 
interference:    Nebraska,148    New    York,149    and   Virginia.150 
 
Washington Court of Appeals explicitly declined to recognize the tort[.]”). 
143. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 362 n.185 (citing Foo v. Foo, 65 
P.3d 182 (Haw. Ct. App. 2003)) (stating that, in an opinion that was “not 
precedential under Hawaii Rule of Appellate Procedure 35[,]” the court 
declined to recognize tortious interference because probate remedies were 
available); see Klein, supra note 89, at 228 (describing Foo as “express[ing] 
the Hawaii Court of Appeals’ antipathy towards recognizing a tort claim 
arising from the alleged depletion of the assets of a marital trust”). 
144. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 362 (citing, inter alia, Ex parte 
Bachelor, 803 So.2d 515 (Ala. 2001); Jackson v. Kelly, 44 S.W.3d 328, 331–34 
(Ark. 2001); Anderson v. Meadowcroft, 661 A.2d 726, 728 (Md. 1995); and 
Hauck v. Seright, 964 P.2d 749, 753 (Mont. 1998)). See also Axe v. Wilson, 96 
P.2d 880, 881 (Kan. 1939). 
145. See, e.g., Umsted v. Umsted, 446 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2006) (citations 
omitted). 
146. Id. 
147. See 44 S.W.3d 328 (Ark. 2001). 
148. Litherland v. Jurgens, 869 N.W.2d 92, 97 (Neb. 2015) (noting that   
the Nebraska Supreme Court had already “expressed strong disapproval of 
the tort in Manon v. Orr, 856 N.W.2d 106, 111 (Neb. 2014)”). 
149. Vogt v. Witmeyer, 665 N.E.2d 189, 190 (N.Y. 1996) (stating that New 
York does not recognize tortious interference); Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill 
104, 110 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) (“[The] plaintiff had no interest in the property 
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Moreover, New York possesses an alternative remedy to tortious 
interference: it “has a very well-developed jurisprudence relating 
to . . . the imposition of a constructive trust . . . .”151 Though this 
equitable remedy may be an imperfect solution to the problems 
that the tort is aimed at solving,152 its availability may be one 
reason why New York remains one of the few jurisdictions that 
has consistently declined to recognize tortious interference.153 
Virginia’s most recent decision on the tort, by contrast, offers little 
insight into the Virginia Supreme Court’s reasons for declining to 
recognize tortious interference.154 Still, Virginia has at least 
addressed the tort and opined on its viability as a cause of action. 
Many states have yet to offer any insight into their approach to  
the tort. 
D. States that Have Not yet Spoken on the Tort 
In particular, twelve states offer little on the subject of 
tortious interference. Alaska,155 Arizona,156 Colorado,157 
 
of which he says he has been deprived by the fraudulent interference of the 
defendant, beyond a mere naked possibility; an interest which might, indeed, 
influence his hopes and expectations, but which is altogether too shadowy   
and evanescent to be dealt with by courts of law.”) (emphasis added). 
150. Economopoulos v. Kolaitis, 528 S.E.2d 714, 720 (Va. 2000)  (“[A]  
cause of action for ‘tortious interference with inheritance’ is not recognized in 
Virginia.”). 
151. Klein, supra note 13, at 282. 
152. Id. at 239–40 (noting that a constructive trust will not “fully 
compensate certain potential tort plaintiffs or deter certain tort 
defendants[,]” given that it is imposed on the party in actual possession of 
estate assets, it is subject to equitable defenses, and it does not enable parties 
to obtain certain types of damages). 
153. See Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 365 (suggesting that the 
“equitable remedy of constructive trust” may offer “adequate relief” to 
disappointed beneficiaries who are not afforded a full recovery through a will 
contest). 
154. See Economopoulos, 528 S.E.2d at 720; see also Klein, supra note 86, 
at 292–93. 
155. Klein, supra note 89, at 214 (“Alaska has no reported cases 
addressing [tortious interference].”); Renfroe, supra note 89, at 396 (stating 
that Alaska has “never considered whether to adopt the tort”). 
156. Fassold, supra note 89, at 31 (“Arizona has not yet recognized  a  
claim for tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance.”); Klein, supra 
note 119, at 19 (“Arizona has a reported opinion merely mentioning the 
tort[.]”); see also Coonley & Coonley v. Turck, 844 P.2d 1177, 1180 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1993) (quoting a letter written by an attorney threatening malpractice 
related to tortious interference). 
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Mississippi,158 Nevada,159 New Hampshire,160 North Dakota,161 
Oklahoma,162 South Dakota,163 Utah,164 Vermont,165 and 
Wyoming166 have either no cases that mention the tort or only 
 
 
157. Klein, supra note 119, at 4 (“[N]o state court [in Colorado] has yet 
granted a recovery” based on tortious interference). Some commentators cite 
Peffer v. Bennett, 523 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1975) and McGregor v. McGregor, 
101 F. Supp. 848 (D. Colo. 1951), aff’d, 201 F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1953) for the 
proposition that Colorado recognizes tortious interference. See, e.g., Fassold, 
supra note 89, at 26 n.2, 30 n.34; Renfroe, supra note 89, at 393, 397 n.88. 
However, at best, Peffer contains a federal court’s projection about how a 
Colorado state court may address the tort. See Peffer, 523 F.2d at 1325. At 
worst, Peffer parrots the ambiguous holding of McGregor, in which it was not 
clear whether Colorado or Louisiana law was being applied. See Klein, supra 
note 2, at 108. Indeed, the authors agree with Diane Klein’s conclusion that 
McGregor applied Louisiana law, not Colorado law.  Id. 
158. Klein, supra note 2, at 126–27. 
159. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 362, n.184; Klein, supra note 
119, at 20 (“Nevada has no reported cases even mentioning tortious 
interference with expectation of inheritance.”). 
160. Klein, supra note 119, at 40; Klein, supra note 13, at 291–92. 
161. Klein, supra note 119, at 40. 
162. See id. at 38; see also Fox v. Kramer (In re Estate of Estes), 983 P.2d 
438, 442 n.2 (Okla. 1999) (“Because the suit was not one in tort, we need not 
address the issue of whether Oklahoma recognizes a tort for wrongful 
interference of an inheritance as urged by [plaintiff].”); Miller v. Johnson, 307 
P.3d 387, 389 (Okla. Civ. App. 2013) (“We interpret Estes to mean Oklahoma 
has never recognized wrongful interference with inheritance as a cognizable 
tort, and our examination of the law does not indicate otherwise.”). 
163. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 362, n.184; Thomas E. 
Simmons, Testamentary Incapacity, Undue Influence, and Insane Delusions, 
60 S.D. L. REV. 175, 214–15 (2015) (“The nascent tort known as tortious 
interference with an expectancy has not to date been recognized or considered 
for recognition in South Dakota, either legislatively or by judicial fiat.”). 
164. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 362, n.184; Klein, supra note 
119, at 19. The only case connected to Utah even mentioning the tort is  
Tarbet v. Miller, No. 2:05-CV-00635 PGC, 2006 WL 1982747, at *3–4  (D.  
Utah July 13, 2006). However, Tarbet says nothing about  whether  Utah 
would recognize tortious interference, and only discusses whether the 
allegations related to that cause of action “provide the particularity required 
by Rule 9(b)” of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Tarbet, 2006 WL 
1982747, at *3–4. 
165. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 362, n.184; Klein, supra note 
13, at 293. 
166. Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 362, n.184; see Klein, supra 
note 119, at 20; see also Estate of McLean ex rel Hall v. Benson, 71 P.3d 750, 
750–54 (Wyo. 2003) (dismissing appeal from order admitting will to probate 
while civil litigation remained pending, where civil litigation included 
allegations of tortious interference). 
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offer references to tortious interference in passing.167 This is 
surprising given the publication of Section 774B in 1979, nearly 
forty years ago.168 It may be that these states have not yet been 
faced with a set of facts that could give rise to a tortious 
interference claim. Certainly, even some of the states that have 
declined to recognize the tort have done so, again, based on the 
facts in front of them, while avoiding rejection of the tort itself.169 
Nevertheless, in time, states that have not yet spoken on the 
subject could alter the existing landscape of the tort significantly. 
That landscape, and the great deal of variety that characterizes it, 
will be the focus of the next section of this Article. 
III. DIFFERENCES AMONG STATES ADOPTING THE TORT 
A. Noteworthy Variations 
While there are a multitude of differences in how states 
approach tortious interference, right down to the label used for the 
tort,170 there are several variations that merit further 
consideration. In particular, many courts require claimants to 
exhaust their probate remedies prior to bringing a claim for 
tortious interference; at least one state has identified an extra 
“element” to the tort; some jurisdictions limit the types of damages 
available  to  successful  litigants;  and  still  others  have  made 
 
 
167. See Estate of McLean ex rel Hall v. Benson, 71 P.3d 750, 752 (Wy. 
2003) (indicates that complaint contained count for intentional interference 
with an expected inheritance without further discussion thereof). 
168. See Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 83, at 360. 
169. Id. at 362. 
170. See, e.g., Ams. United for Life v. The Legion of Christ of N. Am., Inc., 
C.A. No. PC-2016-2900, slip op. at 11 n.6 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2017) (“For 
purposes of clarity, although this tort is referred to in slightly different ways 
throughout the jurisdictions that recognize it, the Court will refer to the tort 
as ‘tortious interference with expectation of inheritance.’ Other iterations 
include ‘tortious interference with inheritance’ or ‘tortious interference with 
expectancy of inheritance.’”); Firestone v. Galbreath, 616 N.E.2d 202, 203 
(Ohio 1993) (“With regard to certified question No. 1, the federal court order 
uses the language, ‘with expectancy or inheritance.’ The briefs of the parties 
present different versions of this phrase: Petitioners . . . state, ‘with 
expectancy of inheritance’; respondents . . . use the language, ‘with 
expectancy of an inheritance’; [another] respondent . . . states, ‘with an 
expected inheritance’; and [other] respondents . . . track the language of the 
federal court order to-wit, ‘with expectancy or inheritance’”) (emphasis and 
alterations in original). 
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pronouncements on the proper court to bring such claims. This 
Article will focus on these critical points of tension among the 
courts that have addressed and/or adopted tortious interference 
because they offer insights into the policy rationale underlying the 
creation of the tort and the wrongs sought to be addressed by its 
adoption. 
B. Elements of Tortious Interference 
Many courts look to the Restatement formulation of tortious 
interference in developing and establishing the elements of the 
cause of action.171 The Restatement formulation can  be  
understood to contain at least five elements: “(1) the existence of 
an expectancy; (2) defendant’s intentional interference with the 
expectancy; (3) conduct that is tortious in itself, such as fraud, 
duress, or undue influence; (4) a reasonable certainty that the 
expectancy would have been realized but for the interference;  and 
(5) damages.”172 In comparison, Florida sets out four elements of 
the tort that combine the “intentional interference” and 
“independently tortious” aspects of the Restatement formulation 
into   a   single   element:   “(1) the   existence   of   an  expectancy; 
(2) intentional interference with the expectancy through tortious 
conduct; (3) causation; and (4) damages.”173  Notably,   Oregon’s 
own adoption of the tort contemplates an extension of an existing 
tort, the tort of intentional interference  with  economic 
relations.174  As a result, the elements are the same although the 
 
 
171. In re Estate of Ellis, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241 (Ill. 2009) (citing, inter alia, 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 744B(e) (AM. LAW INST. 1979); Firestone, 
616 N.E.2d at 203 (adopting tortious interference and declaring “[w]e find 
particularly instructive Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1979) 58, Section 
774B[.]”); accord Huffey v. Lea, 491 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Iowa 1992); Fell v. 
Rambo, 36 S.W.3d 837, 849 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)); see also Renfroe, supra 
note 89, at 132. 
172. Firestone, 616 N.E.2d at 203; see also Fassold, supra note 89, at 27 
(describing the five elements of tortious interference as set out by the 
Restatement). 
173. Whalen v. Prosser, 719 So. 2d 2, 5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (citing 
Davison v. Feuerherd, 391 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Nita Ledford, 
Intentional Interference with Inheritance, 30 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 325, 
327 (1995); see also Henry v. Jones, 202 So. 3d 129, 132–33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2016) (identifying the same four elements of tortious interference);  
Klein, supra note 2, at 110. 
174. Allen v. Hall, 974 P.2d 199, 202 (Or. 1999). 
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economic relation at issue stems from a noncommercial 
relationship: “(1) the existence of a professional or business 
relationship (which could include, e.g., a contract or a prospective 
economic advantage); (2) intentional interference with that 
relationship or advantage; (3) by a third party; (4) accomplished 
through improper means or for an improper purpose; (5) a causal 
effect between the interference and the harm to the relationship  
or prospective advantage; and (6) damages.”175 The difference 
between Oregon’s version of the elements of the tort appears to 
derive from the requirement that a claimant independently 
establish (a) the existence of a relationship or advantage, rather 
than expectancy; and (b) the tortfeasor’s status as a third party to 
that relationship or advantage.176 Again, these two elements are 
fused into one in the traditional Restatement formulation: because 
a claimant need only show his or her expectancy, there is no need 
to make a showing of a relationship with the donor or testator, 
coupled with a need to separately show that the tortfeasor was a 
stranger to that relationship.177 
Nevertheless, each of the foregoing versions of tortious 
interference boil down to the same essential elements: 
interference, through tortious conduct, that causes damages to the 
claimant. Whether the interference is with an “expectancy” itself 
or  with  a  relationship  giving  rise  to  the  expectancy  alters the 
 
175. Id. at 202. 
176. Id. The requirement that a tortfeasor be a third party to the 
relationship at issue in this tort is commonly understood to be a requirement 
in the analogous tort of interference with contractual relations. See, e.g., 
Cromeens, Holloman, Sibert, Inc v. AB Volvo, 349 F.3d 376, 397 (7th Cir. 
2003) (“A party may not be charged with tortious interference with respect to 
its own contract.”); see also A. Michael Ferrill & James K. Spivey, Clearing 
the Sylvania Hurdle: Developments in Business Torts and Dealer 
Termination, 11 ANTITRUST 5, 5 (Fall 1996) (“As a general proposition, a party 
to a contract is legally incapable of tortiously interfering with its own 
contracts.”) (citations ommited). Some courts and commentators speculate 
that this limitation springs from concerns about tort concepts “encroaching” 
onto disputes that are more properly resolved by contract principles. See 
Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, 350 F.3d 6, 15 (2d Cir.  2003)  (discussing  “third 
party” requirement under Georgia law); Fred S. McChesney, Tortious 
Interference with Contract Versus “Efficient” Breach: Theory and Empirical 
Evidence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 136 (1999); Mark P. Gergen, Tortious 
Interference: How It is Engulfing Commercial Law, Why This is Not Entirely 
Bad, and a Prudential Response, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1175, 1197, 1219–20 (1996). 
177. Allen, 974 P.2d at 202. 
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elements slightly, but ultimately does not translate into  
significant differences in analyses.178 For example, in Allen v. 
Hall, the seminal case recognizing tortious interference in Oregon, 
the Supreme Court of Oregon applied the elements of tortious 
interference with economic relations to a tortious interference 
claim, concluding succinctly that: 
Plaintiffs have alleged facts that satisfy the first element 
of the tort, viz., the existence of a prospective economic 
advantage in the form of a prospective inheritance. They 
have also alleged the second and third elements, viz., an 
intentional interference by a third party: They have 
alleged that, after learning that [the testator] intended to 
change his will, [the tortfeasor]—a third party—took 
steps to prevent that eventuality       179 
In other words, the plaintiffs in Allen essentially had to prove the 
same elements as they would be required to do in a Restatement- 
derived tortious interference claim, with the exception that the 
requisite showing was broken down into six elements, rather than 
five.180 
The most significant departure from the elements of Section 
774B comes from Massachusetts, where tortious interference 
contains an element of “continuous interference”: 
The defendant must intentionally interfere with the 
plaintiff’s expectancy in an unlawful way. The plaintiff 
must have a legally protected interest. The plaintiff must 
show that the defendant’s interference acted continuously 
on the donor until the time the expectancy would have 
been realized.181 
 
 
178. Id. (describing the “very close analogy that exists between an 
expectancy of inheritance and those other interests to which this court 
already has extended the protections of the tort of intentional interference 
with prospective economic advantage”) (emphasis added); see also Barone v. 
Barone, 294 S.E.2d 260, 264 (Va. 1982) (describing tortious interference as 
“analogous to tortious interference with business interests . . . or tortious 
interference with contractual relations”). 
179. Allen, 974 P.2d at 204. 
180. Compare id. at 204 with Firestone v. Galbreath, 616 N.E.2d 202, 203 
(Ohio 1993); see also Fassold, supra note 89, at 27 (describing the five 
elements of tortious interference as set out by the Restatement). 
181. Labonte v. Giordano, 687 N.E.2d 1253, 1255 (Mass. 1997) (emphasis 
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It is apparent that the first two requirements echo the 
Restatement formulation: intentional interference that is itself 
unlawful182 and an expectancy that constitutes a legally protected 
interest.183 Unique, then, is Massachusetts’s requirement of the 
interference acting “continuously” on the donor until his or her 
death—a requirement that has existed nearly as long as the tort 
itself in that state.184 As early as 1907, in the pivotal case 
recognizing tortious interference in Massachusetts, Lewis v. 
Corbin, the Supreme Judicial Court indicated that tortious 
interference must operate “up to the time of [the testator’s] death” 
in order to establish an “actionable wrong.”185 Specifically, it held 
that the pleading at issue was “defective” because it failed to make 
factual allegations that would “exclude the possibility that the 
testatrix changed her purpose in regard to [the] legacy [at issue], 
and which show that the fraud continued operative to the time of 
 
 
 
added) (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
182. See, e.g., Firestone, 616 N.E.2d at 203 (including “intentional 
interference” and “conduct by the defendant involving the interference which 
is tortious” and citing Restatement); In re Estate of Ellis, 923 N.E.2d 237, 241 
(Ill. 2009) (same). 
183. See, e.g., Firestone, 616 N.E.2d at 203 (including “expectancy” as 
element and citing Restatement); In re Estate of Ellis, 923 N.E.2d at 241 
(same). With respect to the meaning of “legally protected interest,” 
Massachusetts courts have opined that this element can be understood to 
refer to the types of expected inheritances and bequests that normally qualify 
as expectancies under the Restatement formulation. See, e.g., Coyne v. 
Nascimento, 937 N.E.2d 522 (2010) (unpublished memorandum and order 
pursuant to Rule 1:28) (“[T]he injury to the plaintiff occurs upon the relevant 
donor’s death, the moment at which the plaintiff’s expected inheritance 
becomes a legally protected interest[.]”) (emphasis added); O’Regan v. Migell, 
63 N.E.3d 63 (2016) (unpublished memorandum and order pursuant to Rule 
1:28) (“[The claimant’s] expectation of inheriting under [the testator’s] will 
qualified as a legally-protected interest.”). At least one  commentator’s 
analysis of the tort indicates that perhaps “legally protected interest” was a 
rationale for early courts’ failure to adopt tortious interference—i.e., a “mere 
expectancy,” by contrast, was not protectable—such that Massachusetts’s 
formulation of the tort could derive from those early court decisions. See 
Renfroe, supra note 89, at 133. 
184. Klein, supra note 13, at 264–65 (“Massachusetts has applied a 
distinctive understanding of the tort, requiring specific allegations and proof 
that the wrongful conduct of the defendant acted ‘continuously’  upon  the 
donor until the legacy would be ‘realized’ (i.e., the donor’s death).”); see also 
Lewis v. Corbin, 81 N.E. 248, 250 (Mass. 1907). 
185. Lewis, 81 N.E. at 250. 
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her death, and thus caused the loss to the plaintiff.”186 
Several decades later, in Labonte v. Giordano, the Supreme 
Judicial Court expounded upon its rationale for the requirement 
that such interference be “continuous.”187 In essence, the court 
explained, the condition could help to demonstrate that a 
tortfeasor’s conduct caused the plaintiff’s damage; that the donor 
had “no opportunity . . . to overcome the defendant’s interference” 
before his or her death; and that the cause of action had properly 
accrued since condition in fact required the donor to have passed 
away.188 It is fair to say that the first two reasons appear simply 
to state that the “continuous interference” requirement supports a 
claimant’s case for causation in attempting to show tortious 
interference.189 The third “function”  of  the  continuous 
interference requirement offers more insight into the 
Massachusetts iteration of tortious interference because it shows 
that the cause of action only arises at the time of a donor’s death, 
because “any such expectancy would only be realized at that 
time.”190 Put differently, Massachusetts places the availability of 
tortious interference squarely in the time after a donor’s death, 
and not before.191 As will be discussed, other states have limited 
the availability of tortious interference to actions after the death  
of a donor using different methods; it appears only Massachusetts 
has taken the step to include this requirement in the very 
elements of the tort.192 
 
 
 
 
186. Id. 
187. Labonte v. Giordano, 687 N.E.2d 1253, 1255 (Mass. 1997). 
188. Id. 
189. Indeed, the Supreme Judicial Court directly states that requiring 
continuous interference serves the function of showing “that the defendant’s 
interference was the legal cause of damage to the plaintiff.” Id. (emphasis 
added). Moreover, the suggestion that a showing of “continuous interference” 
demonstrates that the donor had “no opportunity” to overcome any such 
interference also goes directly to the issue of causation—i.e. was a donor’s 
disposition of property due to interference, or was he or she able to overcome 
such interference before her death? Id. In this way, the first two “functions” 
cited by the Supreme Judicial Court for this requirement appear to be 
duplicative. 
190. Id. (emphasis added). 
191. Id. 
192. Klein, supra note 13, at 264–65. 
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C. Adequate Probate Remedies and Collateral Attack 
Arguably the most significant difference among jurisdictions 
that have adopted tortious interference is how each state answers 
the question of whether a claimant may proceed despite the 
existence of “adequate” probate remedies or whether those 
remedies must be exhausted before bringing a cause of action in 
tort.193 More often than not, courts that have addressed tortious 
interference require litigants to exhaust probate remedies or 
otherwise prohibit them from proceeding with the tort action if 
adequate probate remedies exist.194 Otherwise, the logic goes, the 
tort action would constitute an impermissible “collateral attack”  
on a probate proceeding.195 For example, if a will contest is 
available to litigants attempting to initiate a tortious interference 
claim, and “a successful contest would provide complete relief,” 
courts have held that proceeding on the tort is not “warranted.”196 
Only a few take the position that a tortious interference claimant 
can  proceed  even  if  there  are  presumably  adequate  probate 
 
193. See Plimpton v. Gerrard, 668 A.2d 882, 886 (Me. 1995) (describing “a 
rule, adopted in several jurisdictions, which requires plaintiffs to exhaust 
probate remedies before pursuing actions for tortious interference with an 
expected legacy, provided that the probate remedies are adequate to 
compensate them for their damages”); see also DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So. 2d   
216, 221 (Fla. 1981); Robinson v. First State Bank of Monticello, 454 N.E. 2d 
288, 293–94 (Ill. 1983); Allen v. Lovell’s Adm’x, 197 S.W.2d 424, 427 (Ky. 
1946); Labonte, 687 N.E.2d at 1256; Johnson v. Stevenson, 152 S.E.2d 214, 
217 (N.C. 1967); Firestone v. Galbreath, 616 N.E.2d 202, 203 (Ohio 1993); 
Renfroe, supra note 89, at 140–41; Orr, supra note 89, at 751 (“Many 
jurisdictions . . . have refused to provide relief under the tort because the 
plaintiff had standing to contest the decedent’s will in the probate court and 
failed to do so.”). 
194. See Umsted v. Umsted, 446 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 2006) (recognizing 
as the “majority position that a cause of action for tortious interference with 
an expectancy of inheritance, if it lies at all, would not lie where an adequate 
statutory remedy is available but has not been pursued”); see also Fassold, 
supra note 89, at 28 (“Most states that have considered the issue have held 
that a claim for tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance may only 
be brought where conventional probate relief would be inadequate.”); 
Johnson, supra note 9, at 774; Hortenstine, supra note 97, at 742 (identifying 
Illinois as a state where “all remedies via will contest must be exhausted” 
prior to bringing a tortious interference claim). 
195. DeWitt, 408 So. 2d at 218 (citing cases); see also Fassold, supra note 
89, at 31; Johnson, supra note 9, at 775–76. 
196. See Fassold, supra note 89, at 29 (citing In re Estate of Hoover, 513 
N.E.2d 991, 992 (Ill. App. 1987)). 
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remedies for the underlying “wrong.”197 To better understand the 
difference in approach, it is helpful to begin with one of the first 
decisions to explore at length the rationale for requiring litigants 
to exhaust their probate remedies: the Supreme Court of Florida’s 
decision of DeWitt v. Duce.198 
In DeWitt, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit199 certified the following question to the Supreme Court of 
Florida: 
Does Florida law, statutory or otherwise, preclude 
plaintiffs from proving the essential elements of their 
claim for tortious interference with an inheritance where 
the alleged wrongfully procured will has been probated in 
a Florida court and plaintiffs had notice of the probate 
proceeding and an opportunity to contest the validity of 
the will therein but chose not to do so?200 
The facts of the case were straightforward: Arthur Welch died 
testate in 1975, and his will was admitted to probate in Florida.201 
Thereafter, Plaintiffs Evelyn G. DeWitt and Mabel  M.  DeWitt 
filed a Petition for Revocation of Probate of Welch’s will.202 
Ultimately, however, the plaintiffs decided to dismiss their 
Petition, opting instead to take pursuant to the disposition in 
Welch’s will.203 Yet less than three years later, the plaintiffs 
initiated suit against Welch’s housekeeper, Estelle Duce, in  
federal court, bringing a claim for tortious interference.204 Their 
complaint alleged that Duce, along with two others, had unduly 
influenced Welch, and that the defendant’s undue influence  
caused  Welch  to  replace  his  prior  will  with  another  will  that 
 
197. See Plimpton, 668 A.2d at 887; Barone v. Barone, 294 S.E.2d 260,   
264 (Va. 1982). 
198. 408 So.2d at 218. 
199. By the time that the DeWitt decision was issued, Florida came within 
the newly created Eleventh Circuit, which is why the decision refers to the 
“former Fifth Circuit”; when the question was originally certified to the 
Supreme Court of Florida, the relevant court of appeals was still the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See History of the Federal 
Judiciary, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home. 
nsf/page/landmark_21.html, (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
200. DeWitt, 408 So.2d at 217. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
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disfavored the plaintiffs.205 
The federal district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, 
finding that pursuant to Florida Statutes Section 733.103(2),206 
plaintiffs’ action was precluded because in essence, they would be 
“relitigating issues of undue influence and testamentary capacity, 
and thus prevent[] proof of elements vital to a claim of tortious 
interference.”207 After the plaintiffs appealed, the Fifth Circuit 
certified the issue to the Supreme Court of Florida.208 
The Supreme Court of Florida acknowledged that tortious 
interference had been recognized before by courts in the state, but 
noted it had never before reached the issue of whether proceeding 
with the tort would be a “collateral attack” on a preexisting  
probate court decision.209 The court surveyed a number of 
decisions on the subject and drew the conclusion that “[c]ases 
which allow the action for tortious interference with a 
testamentary expectancy are predicated on the inadequacy of 
probate remedies.”210 In other words, the problem of collateral 
attack only arose to the extent that a litigant possessed an 
adequate remedy in the probate proceedings and, regardless, 
pursued an action for tortious interference.211 The plaintiffs in 
DeWitt, the court concluded, had an adequate remedy in the 
probate proceedings because Welch’s previous will, favoring the 
plaintiffs, existed.212 Accordingly, a will contest could have 
theoretically made the plaintiffs whole.213 The DeWitt court 
identified the possibility for the converse situation to arise, noting 
language from W. Bowe & D. Parker’s treatise, Page On Wills, 
which stated: 
Probate can strike from the will something that is in it as 
 
 
205. Id. 
206. “In any collateral action or proceeding relating to devised property, 
the probate of a will in Florida shall be conclusive of its due execution; that it 
was executed by a competent testator, free of fraud, duress, mistake, and 
undue influence; and of the fact that the will was unrevoked on the testator’s 
death.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.103(2) (Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.). 
207. DeWitt, 408 So.2d at 218. 
208. Id. at 217–18. 
209. Id. at 218. 
210. Id. at 219. 
211. See id. 
212. Id. at 220. 
213. Id. 
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a result of fraud but cannot add to the will a provision 
that is not there nor can the probate court bring into 
being a will which the testator was prevented from 
making and executing by fraud.214 
The foregoing exemplifies the circumstances under which 
courts have been willing to recognize tortious interference. After 
all, probate remedies are hardly adequate where a will contest 
would never enable a litigant to probate a favorable will because, 
for instance, such a will never existed. The Supreme Court of 
Florida’s reasoning in DeWitt has been echoed by other courts in 
the time since. 
The decision of Plimpton v. Gerrard by the Maine Supreme 
Judicial Court stands in sharp contrast to the preceding 
authority.215 Again, the underlying facts are relatively simple. 
Axel and Flossie Plimpton had one child, Bernard Plimpton.216 
However, the senior Plimptons left the bulk of their estate to 
Martin Gerrard, a man who “established a relationship with the 
Plimptons when they were elderly and in poor  health.”217  
Bernard Plimpton, the plaintiff, brought suit against Martin 
Gerrard for tortious interference with an expected inheritance.218 
In holding that the plaintiff had standing to pursue this claim, the 
Maine Supreme Judicial Court set itself apart from DeWitt and 
other decisions concerning the existence of adequate probate 
remedies, stating: 
The theoretical possibility of adequate relief in the 
Probate Court does not compel Bernard to go there to 
pursue his tortious interference claim. The law provides 
concurrent jurisdiction in the Probate Court and the 
Superior Court for Bernard’s claim of undue influence in 
the inter vivos transfer (though the Probate Court action 
could only be filed by the personal representative). The 
very  concept  of  concurrent  jurisdiction  is  inconsistent 
 
 
 
214. Id. at 219 n.7 (quoting W. BOWE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON WILLS, § 14.8 
at 706–07 (1960) (footnote omitted)). 
215. 668 A.2d 882 (Me. 1995). 
216. Id. at 884. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. 
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with a preference for one jurisdiction over another.219 
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, in so holding, emphasized 
the concept of concurrent jurisdiction in determining that the 
plaintiff did not need to first exhaust his potential probate 
remedies to bring a tortious interference claim.220 Indeed, the 
differing remedies available to the plaintiff in a civil case versus a 
probate action were highlighted by the court in Plimpton and are 
worthy of discussion in their own right.221 
D. Damages and Adequacy of Remedies 
Tortious interference offers an opportunity for litigants to 
recover directly from a bad actor, rather than from an estate.222 
However, the source of a claimant’s recovery is not the only 
difference between recovering in a civil action as compared to a 
probate action. A party successful in a civil case can receive more 
than just that to which he or she was entitled in a will contest.223 
Specifically, courts have acknowledged that in pursuing a claim 
for tortious interference, it becomes possible for parties to obtain 
compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees, emotional distress 
damages, and  even  punitive  damages.224   This  distinction from 
 
 
219. Id. at 887. 
220. See id. 
221. Id. 
222. Klein, supra note 86, at 265 (“As a legal claim in personam against 
the interfering tortfeasor, the costs of prosecuting and defending the action— 
and paying a judgment, if the action is successful—are borne by the parties, 
not the estate. In contrast to a will contest or a probate claim, the tort 
defendant must answer.”); see also Johnson, supra note 9, at 772;  
Hortenstine, supra note 97, at 756 (describing the tort claim as “an in 
personam judgment . . . brought against a tortfeasor”). 
223. See also Johnson, supra note 9, at 772; Hortenstine, supra note 97,   
at 741–42. 
224. Huffey v. Lea, 491 N.W.2d 518, 521 (Iowa 1992); see also Orr, supra 
note 89, at 751, 777–78; see also Fassold, supra note 89, at 26 (acknowledging 
that tortious interference “permits the recovery of punitive damages and 
attorneys’ fees, which a will contest normally does not”); Renfroe, supra note 
89, at 391–92 (describing remedies available in tortious interference actions 
and including “damages . . . [equal to] the value that the plaintiff lost as a 
result of the defendant’s tortious interference[;] . . . [c]onsequential 
damages[;]” and, in “some jurisdictions . . . punitive damages, and . . . 
damages for emotional distress”); but see DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So. 2d 216, 220 
n.11 (Fla. 1981); In re Estate of Hoover, 513 N.E.2d 991, 992 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1987). 
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what a litigant may recover in a will contest is important because, 
as commentators have noted, without the existence of tortious 
interference, the realities of litigating a will contest may enable 
tortfeasors to reap the benefits of their bad acts, consequence- 
free.225 
Consider this: if a testator executes a will benefiting  two 
heirs, and one heir later convinces the testator to change the will 
in his favor using fraud, at the testator’s death, the malfeasant 
heir can only benefit.226 The original will still benefits both heirs, 
so even if the later will is voided through a will contest because it 
was procured by fraud, the bad actor can still take under the 
will.227 Worse still, the bad actor’s attorneys’ fees will generally  
be paid by the estate.228 Arguably, then, the tortfeasor risks 
nothing by engaging in tortious conduct that interferes with a 
third party’s expected inheritance.229 
Nevertheless, the opportunities to provide  additional 
remedies and to deter bad actors from attempting to benefit from 
their tortious acts, are still not always enough to push courts to 
find a litigant’s probate relief inadequate.230  For  example,  on 
more than one occasion, courts have dismissed the availability of 
punitive  damages  as  a  method  of  demonstrating  that  probate 
 
225. Fassold, supra note 89, at 26 (citing Curtis E. Shirley, Tortious 
Interference with an Expectancy, 41 RES GESTAE 16 (Oct. 1997)); see also 
Johnson, supra note 9, at 770 (describing a similar example); Hortenstine, 
supra note 97, at 741–42 (identifying the different remedies available in a   
will contest versus tort litigation). 
226. Fassold, supra note 89, at 26. 
227. Id. 
228. Id.; see also Orr, supra note 89, at 779. 
229. See Fassold, supra note 89, at 26; see also Hortenstine, supra  note 
97, at 742 (noting that “if one thinks they can tortiously interfere with 
another’s expectancy, so as to procure a benefit for themselves, they have 
nothing to lose by ‘going for it’”). 
230. See, e.g., DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So.2d 216, 220 n.11 (Fla. 1981) (“For 
purposes of adequacy of relief we do not consider punitive damages as a valid 
expectation. Adequacy is predicated on what the probate court can give as 
compared to what the plaintiff reasonably expected from the testator prior to 
interference. Additionally, we can find no case authority allowing punitive 
damages in this type of action.”) (emphasis added); see also Fassold, supra 
note 89, at 29 (acknowledging that the “unavailability [of punitive damages] 
does not itself constitute inadequate relief, such that a contestant would be 
permitted automatically to bring a tort action in which such damages are 
sought”); Johnson, supra note 9, at 774 (“Commentators have noted that the 
probate system has virtually no deterrent effect.”) (footnote omitted). 
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court cannot afford adequate relief.231 This is not necessarily the 
case with attorneys’ fees: interestingly, a recent Massachusetts 
Superior Court decision suggests that attorneys’ fees, which are 
generally not available in probate court, may offer an alternative 
basis for pursuing relief in a separate tort action.232  In Hadayia 
v. Kay, the Superior Court recounted plaintiffs’ successful will 
contest against the defendants in probate court.233 In that action, 
plaintiffs had shown that the late Jane Naimey, who originally 
executed a will in 1986 favoring the plaintiffs, executed a new will 
in 1991 favoring the defendants, a family that “gained overall 
control of all of Jane’s financial and personal affairs” in a matter  
of weeks following the first meeting between the defendants and 
Jane.234 The probate court found that the 1991 will was  the 
product of undue influence and fraud, ordered the defendants to 
reimburse Jane’s estate, and, eventually, allowed the plaintiffs to 
probate the 1986 will.235 
The questions in the superior court became (1) whether to 
grant the plaintiffs summary judgment on their claim against the 
defendants for tortious interference, based upon the probate 
court’s findings, and (2) to what damages were plaintiffs 
entitled.236 In response to the first question, the superior court 
held that the facts found by the probate court “clearly include[d] 
each of the[] elements” of tortious interference as established in 
Massachusetts.237 To the latter, the Hadayia decision recognized 
that although the American rule traditionally precluded recovery 
 
231. Johnson, supra note 9, at 774; see also Firestone v. Galbreath, 895 F. 
Supp. 917, 926 (S.D. Ohio 1995); Maxwell v. Sw. Nat’l Bank, 593  F. Supp. 
250, 253 (D. Kan. 1984); Jackson v. Kelly, 44 S.W.3d 328, 333 (Ark. 2001); In 
re Estate of Hoover, 513 N.E.2d 991, 992 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987). 
232. Hadayia v. Kay, No. C.A. 97-01110, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 489 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 1, 1999) (permitting plaintiffs to pursue tort action to 
recover attorneys’ fees following successful probate court action concerning 
“wrongfully procured” will). 
233. Id.  at  *9. 
234. Id. at *2, 4–5. 
235. Id. at *9–10. 
236. Id. at *15–21. 
237. Id. at *14–15 (citing Labonte v. Giordano, 687 N.E.2d 1253, 1254–55 
(Mass. 1997)) (“[T]he plaintiffs must prove three elements: that they had a 
legally protected interest; that the defendants intentionally interfered with 
the plaintiffs’ expectancy in an unlawful way, such as by duress, fraud, or 
undue influence; and that the defendants’ interference acted continuously on 
the donor until the time the expectancy would have been realized.”). 
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of attorneys’ fees, an exception was available for cases of tortious 
interference “requiring the victim of the tort to sue or defend 
against a third party in order to protect his rights.”238 It remains 
to be seen whether, unlike punitive damages, the recovery of 
attorneys’ fees will be viewed by other courts in a similar way: as  
a way to pursue tortious interference despite the existence of an 
available will contest. At least a few courts have allowed for the 
award of attorneys’ fees and costs as part of ensuring that  
litigants are afforded a complete recovery—perhaps the better 
rule.239 
E. Inter Vivos Conveyances and Tortious Interference Before a 
Testator’s Death 
Last, courts remain divided over the application of tortious 
interference where there have been challenges to inter vivos 
conveyances or to testamentary bequests drafted and set out in 
estate planning documents before the death of a testator.  As to  
the latter, Maine appears to be the only state that has permitted 
so called “pre-death” actions  to  proceed.240  Specifically,  in 
Harmon v. Harmon, the plaintiff claimed that his brother and 
sister-in-law had, “by fraud and undue influence induced the 
[p]laintiff’s mother . . . while she was 87 years old and in ill  
health, to transfer to the [d]efendants valuable  property.”241  
These transfers had the practical effect of disinheriting the 
plaintiff.242 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that the 
plaintiff, as an “expectant legatee,” could proceed with his tortious 
interference claim because the tort was meant to protect his 
interest in an “expectation, and not the certainty,” of a future 
benefit under a will.243 The Harmon court held that the injury  
was “complete” once the wrongful conduct occurred, and the 
problem was then only one of valuation.244  At present, Maine is 
 
238. Id. at *20 (quoting M.F. Roach Co. v. Town of Provincetown, 247 
N.E.2d 377, 378 (Mass. 1969)). 
239. See  Peffer  v.  Bennett,  523  F.2d  1323,  1324–26  (10th  Cir.   1975); 
Huffey v. Lea, 491 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Iowa 1992); King v. Acker, 725 S.W.2d 
750, 756 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); see also Hortenstine, supra note 97, at 759–60. 
240. Harmon v. Harmon, 404 A.2d 1020, 1024–25 (Me. 1979). 
241. Id. at 1021. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. at 1021–22. 
244. Id. at 1023. 
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the only state that has gone this far in its recognition of tortious 
interference, and other courts have explicitly rejected such 
application.245 
Despite Maine standing alone as the sole jurisdiction to allow 
the tort under such circumstances, other states, such as Georgia, 
have made tortious interference available with respect to inter 
vivos conveyances.246 In particular, courts note that inter vivos 
conveyances could specifically result in a will contest being 
deemed inadequate, since even a litigant’s success in a will contest 
would not necessarily extend to the return of such inter vivos 
transfers.247   For example, even in  DeWitt, wherein the Supreme 
 
245. See, e.g., Whalen v. Prosser, 719 So.2d 2, 3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) 
(affirming dismissal of action for tortious interference where claim was “filed 
by a nonfamily member prior to the death of the testator under 
circumstances that do not suggest that a remedy subsequent to death will be 
unavailable or inadequate”); Labonte v. Giordano, 687 N.E.2d 1253, 1256 
(Mass. 1997) (declaring the court to be “unpersuaded by the conclusions in   
the Harmon opinion and declin[ing] to recognize a new cause of action” for 
tortious interference where a donor is still alive, but granting leave to amend 
her complaint because of the donor’s death during the pendency of the 
plaintiff’s appeal); see also Fassold, supra note 89, at 28; Renfroe, supra note 
89, at 391: but see Carlton v. Carlton, 575 So. 2d 239, 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1991) (“It is our opinion that when there is an allegation that the testator had 
a fixed intention to make a bequest in favor of the plaintiff and there existed 
a strong probability that this intention would have been carried out but for 
the wrongful acts of the defendant there exists a cause of action.”). 
246. See Metro Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, Inc. v.  Ichthus  
Cmty. Tr., 780 S.E.2d 311, 319–20 (Ga. 2015) (recognizing a cause of action  
for “tortious interference with a gift”); see also Fassold, supra note 89, at 29 
(noting that courts have permitted plaintiffs to bring tortious interference 
claims “in conjunction with a will contest” based on a decedent’s inter vivos 
transfers induced by a tortfeasor) (citing Estate of Jeziorski, 516 N.E.2d 422, 
426 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)); Johnson, supra note 9, at 777–78 (discussing cases 
that involved deprivation of “of a true inter vivos gift” before the major  
decision in Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 275 B.R. 5 (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. 2002)). 
247. See Orr, supra note 89, at 764–65 (describing “alleged wrongful 
lifetime transfers that remove property from a decedent’s probate estate” as a 
circumstance in which probate relief would be inadequate). The Supreme 
Court of Illinois similarly described the situation as follows: 
[A] will contest would not have provided sufficient relief to 
[plaintiff/appellant] because it would not have extended to the 
alleged inter vivos transfers of property. [Plaintiff/Appellant] alleged 
that [tortfeasor] depleted [donor’s] estate by inducing her to transfer 
assets worth more than $1 million to him prior to her death. In a 
successful will contest, [plaintiff/appellant] could have recovered only 
assets that were part of the estate upon [donor’s] death but could not 
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Court of Florida rejected the application of tortious interference, it 
noted that: “[i]f defendant’s tortious conduct had caused the 
testator to make an inter vivos conveyance to defendant of assets 
that would otherwise have been part of the estate, setting aside 
the will would be inappropriate redress and consequently a tort 
action is properly allowed.”248 
In conclusion, while Maine is admittedly alone on the 
“frontier” of tortious interference jurisprudence in allowing the  
tort action to proceed prior to the death of a testator,249 decisions 
concerning inter vivos conveyances lay the groundwork for the 
concept that the wrongful conduct may occur prior to the testator’s 
death and that the harm may be “complete” prior to probating the 
relevant will. Practical considerations of the benefits  of  
proceeding in tort before, rather than after, the testator dies may 
ultimately convince other courts to join Maine in its flexible 
approach. 
IV. RHODE ISLAND AND TORTIOUS INTERFEERENCE WITH AN EXPECTED 
INHERITANCE 
A. Americans United for Life v. Legion of Christ of North 
America, Inc. 
In a ground breaking decision, the Rhode Island Superior 
Court recently acknowledged the viability of Tortious Interference 
in Rhode Island in the case of Americans United for Life v. Legion 
of Christ of North America, Inc.250 The decision followed  the 
court’s previous dismissal of a case brought against the Legion of 
Christ by Mary Lou Dauray, the niece of the decedent (Gabrielle 
Mee) whom the Legion allegedly defrauded and unduly influenced 
 
have reached the assets transferred during her lifetime. 
In re Estate of Ellis, 923 N.E.2d 237, 243 (Ill. 2009) (emphasis added). 
248. DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So. 2d 216, 219 (Fla. 1981) (citing Hegarty v. 
Hegarty, 52 F. Supp. 296 (D. Mass. 1943)); Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013 (Me. 
1979)); see also Johnson, supra note 9, at 781 (providing example of an 
expectancy “[r]educed or [d]efeated by a [t]ortiously [i]nduced [i]nter [v]ivos 
[d]iminution of the [t]estator’s [p]robate [e]state,” i.e. pre-death inter vivos 
conveyances). 
249. Harmon, 404 A.2d at 1021; but see Carlton, 575 So. 2d at 241 
(indicating that Florida may offer recognition under certain limited 
circumstances). 
250. Ams. United for Life v. The Legion of Christ of N. Am., Inc., C.A. No. 
PC-2016-2900, slip op. at 13, 15–16 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2017). 
1_MURPHY&CLARKE_FINAL EDIT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/19/17 6:21 AM 
 
 
 
2017]    TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE & INHERITANCE       573 
 
to give it her vast fortune.251 Both the case brought by Dauray  
and the case brought by Americans United for Life (Americans 
United) alleged the same facts, explained below. 
Throughout her lifetime, Mrs. Gabrielle Mee was a devout, 
pious, and conservative Catholic.252 In 1950 she wed Timothy 
Mee.253 The two donated generously and copiously to religious  
and secular charities throughout their thirty-five year 
marriage.254 In 1989, a few years after Mr. Mee’s death, Mrs. Mee 
was introduced to Father Marcial Maciel, the founder of the  
Legion of Christ, a Catholic order comprised of priests and 
seminarians.255    Shortly  thereafter,  Mrs.  Mee  made  a  gift  of 
$1,000,000 to the Legion.256 Mrs. Mee quickly became  the  
Legion’s devoted disciple.257 Father Maciel, whom Mrs. Mee came 
to view as a saint, wrote to her frequently, encouraging her to 
make further gifts, and telling her how proud Mr. Mee would be of 
her for donating to the Legion.258 At Father Maciel’s personal 
invitation, Mrs. Mee traveled abroad with him on official Legion 
business.259 Father Maciel also included Mrs. Mee specifically in 
his prayers at mass and fast-tracked her to the status of 
“consecrated woman” in Regnum Christi, a reclusive and  
cloistered subsidiary order of the Legion.260 After moving into a 
Regnum Christi facility in Smithfield, Rhode Island, Mrs. Mee’s 
contact with family and friends was monitored, controlled, and in 
many instances prevented.261 Her access to news media was also 
obstructed at times.262 
Meanwhile, at the urging of Father Maciel and other Legion 
 
 
251. Dauray v. Estate of Mee, Nos. PB 10-1195, PB 11-2640, PB 11-2757, 
2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2012). 
252. Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 2; Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 
141, at *2. 
253. Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *3. 
254. See id. at *3–4. 
255. Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 5. 
256. Id. 
257. Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *6–7. 
258. Id. at *33–34, 43. 
259. Id. at *33. 
260. Id. at *21, 26; Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 5. 
261. Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *23, 27; Ams. United for   
Life, slip op. at 5. 
262. Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *23, 27; Ams. United for   
Life, slip op. at 5–6. 
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priests, Mrs. Mee continued to gift $60,000,000 of her fortune, 
through lifetime gifts, trusts, and testamentary instruments, to 
the Legion: in 1991, Mrs. Mee made a gift of $3,000,000 to the 
Legion and created a will, leaving ninety percent of her assets to 
the Legion and ten percent to Americans United.263 In 1995, Mrs. 
Mee executed a codicil to her 1991 will which revoked her gift to 
Americans United and made the Legion sole beneficiary.264 
In 1996, the Legion offered to pledge Mrs. Mee’s assets to 
negotiate a $25 million loan from Fleet Bank (now Bank of 
America) to purchase a seminary facility in Thornwood, New York 
(the Thornwood Loan).265 In 2000, counsel for the Legion drafted, 
and Mrs. Mee executed, a broad power of attorney in favor of 
Father Bannon, effectively giving the Legion full control over Mrs. 
Mee’s finances, and a new will, leaving all of Mrs. Mee’s assets to 
the Legion and appointing Father Bannon as the executor of her 
estate.266 And in March 2001, the Legion and Mrs. Mee together 
brought suit against Fleet, after it refused to terminate Mrs. Mee’s 
Revocable Trust and distribute the principal from that trust and 
Mr. Mee’s Charitable Foundation to the Legion in order to 
discharge the Thornwood Loan.267 The case was eventually 
settled, and Mrs. Mee’s Revocable Trust was liquidated to pay the 
Thornwood Loan.268 
Americans United alleged that Mrs. Mee was insulated from 
information that her beloved spiritual advisor, Father Maciel, was 
a fraud and inveterate criminal, and “led a sordid life,” which most 
certainly would have impacted her continued giving.269 Despite 
maintaining an image as a celibate and saintly priest, Father 
Maciel “was, among other things, a serial sexual abuser”; he had 
engaged in relationships with several women, fathered children, 
two of whom he is alleged to have molested, and sexually abused 
teenaged seminarians.270 
 
263. Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *2, 5–6; Ams. United for   
Life, slip op. at 3. 
264. Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *8; Ams. United for Life, slip 
op. at 3. 
265. Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *37. 
266. Id. at *9, 23, 27. 
267. Id. at *9–10. 
268. Id. 
269. Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 6. 
270. Id.; see Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *10–12. 
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In 1997, the Hartford Courant published an article describing 
some of Father Maciel’s actions, including “misuse of prescription 
drugs, financial impropriety, and other allegations.”271 Per the 
article, “nine men accused Father Maciel of sexually abusing them 
from the 1940s to 1960s.”272 Americans United alleged that  
Legion officials covered up the scandal and kept this information 
from Mrs. Mee.273 
Americans United claimed that by 2006, high-ranking Legion 
officials knew about Father Maciel’s relationships, children, and 
sexual abuse and made a pact to protect Father Maciel and keep 
the information secret.274 It further alleged that the information 
was kept from Mrs. Mee even when, later in 2006, the Vatican 
issued a Communiqué inviting Father Maciel “to a reserved life of 
penitence and prayer, relinquishing any form of public 
ministry.”275 
Mrs. Mee died on May 16, 2008, at the age of ninety-six.276 
The Legion publicly acknowledged that Father Maciel had a 
daughter in February 2009, nine months after Mrs. Mee’s death 
and more than a year after Father Maciel’s death.277 In May  
2010, the Vatican released a “scathing report regarding [Father 
Maciel’s] gross misconduct.”278 
Americans United received notice of its interest in Mrs. Mee’s 
estate in December 2013.279 It thereafter moved to intervene in 
litigation brought by Ms. Dauray, after the case had been 
dismissed on summary judgment for lack of standing and  
appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.280 The Supreme 
Court denied Americans United’s appeal.281 About  one  month 
after the Executor closed Mrs. Mee’s Estate, Americans United 
 
 
271. Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *8 (citation omitted). 
272. Id. 
273. See Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 6, 8–9. 
274. Complaint ¶ 68, Ams. United for Life v. The Legion of Christ of N. 
Am., Inc., C.A. No. PC-2016-2900 (R.I. Super. Ct. June 22, 2016). 
275. Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *10–11. 
276. Id. at *16. 
277. See Complaint ¶¶ 90–116, Ams. United for Life v. The Legion of 
Christ of N. Am., Inc., C.A. No. PC-2016-2900 (R.I. Super. Ct. June 22, 2016). 
278. Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 6. 
279. Id. at 20. 
280. Id.; see Dauray, 2012 R.I. Super. LEXIS 141, at *38 
281. Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 20. 
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petitioned to reopen, alleging that the Legion was guilty of unduly 
influencing and defrauding Mrs. Mee.282 The probate  court  
denied the petition and the superior court affirmed on appeal.283 
Americans United then brought a separate and independent 
action against the Legion, alleging fraud, undue  influence, 
tortious interference, civil conspiracy, and sought a constructive 
trust.284 Americans United claimed that Father Maciel and other 
Legion officials systematically preyed upon Mrs. Mee, taking 
advantage of her piety to manipulate her and strip her of her 
fortune.285 Americans United further claimed that Mrs.  Mee 
never learned the truth about Father Maciel or the Legion  of 
Christ before her death on May 16, 2008, and that she never  
would have gifted to the Legion had she known about Father 
Maciel’s gross misconduct.286 
The Legion of Christ moved to dismiss Americans United’s 
suit.287 Much of the briefing and oral argument was dedicated to 
Americans United’s claim of tortious interference, an area that the 
court labeled “thought-provoking.”288 In deciding the Legion’s 
motion, the court first considered whether recognition of the tort 
constituted creation of a new cause of action, which can only occur 
in extreme circumstances absent a legislative remedy, or whether 
it constituted mere extension of the existing common-law cause of 
action, tortious interference with contractual relations.289 
Americans United argued that many other jurisdictions had 
extended the cause of action for tortious interference with contract 
rights or business relations to cover tortious interference with an 
inheritance or gift,290 and that Rhode Island has long recognized a 
cause of action for tortious interference with contract rights or 
other business relations.291  The court agreed and further cited 
 
282. Id. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. at 2, 7. 
285. See id. at 6. 
286. Complaint ¶¶ 87–89, Ams. United for Life v. The Legion of Christ of 
N. Am., Inc., C.A. No. PC-2016-2900 (R.I. Super. Ct. June 22, 2016); see Ams. 
United for Life, slip op. at 6. 
287. Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 1–2. 
288. Id. at 11. 
289. Id. 
290. Id. at 13; see, e.g., Allen v. Hall, 974 P.2d 199, 202, 206 (Or. 1999); 
Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013, 1018 (Me. 1979). 
291. Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 13–14; see, e.g., Jolicoeur Furniture 
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Comment a of Section 774B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
which provides that “tortious interference with expectation of 
inheritance ‘represents an extension to a type of noncontractual 
relation of the principle found in the liability for intentional 
interference with prospective contracts stated in [Section] 
766B.’”292 
In response to the Legion of Christ’s argument that  
recognition of tortious interference would interfere with Rhode 
Island’s “comprehensive statutory scheme designed to secure the 
expeditious and conclusive settlement of estates and quieting of 
titles,”293 the court held that “[a] tort claim does not become a will 
contest simply because it arises out of the facts relating to the 
making or unmaking of a will.”294 On the contrary, the court 
explained: 
A successful tort action results in a judgment against the 
defendant for money damages, not a determination of the 
validity of a particular will or other testamentary result. 
The legal differences between a will contest and the tort 
are far-reaching. The tort, an action at law, allows 
compensatory and punitive damages.295 
The focus in an action alleging tortious interference is on the 
plaintiff’s injury, rather than the testator’s intent.  Moreover, 
while a probate proceeding is an in rem proceeding which 
“determines what will happen to the assets in the testator’s 
probate estate,” a tort action can result in a judgment against an 
individual, “to be paid from that individual’s personal assets.”296 
Thus, the court held, a claim for tortious interference is distinct 
from a will contest and does not interfere with the expeditious and 
conclusive settlement of estates and quieting of titles.297 
The court next considered the Legion of Christ’s argument 
 
 
Co. v. Baldelli, 653 A.2d 740, 751–52 (R.I. 1995); Belliveau Building Corp. v. 
O’Coin, 763 A.2d 622, 624, 626–27 (R.I. 2000). 
292. Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 15 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 774B (AM. LAW INST. 1979)). 
293. Id. at 16 (quoting Umsted v. Umsted, 446 F.3d 17, 21  (1st  Cir. 
2006)). 
294. Id. at 16 (quoting Allen v. Hall, 974 P.2d 199, 204 (Or. 1999)). 
295. Id. (quoting Munn v. Briggs, 185 Cal. App. 4th 578, 586–87 (2010)). 
296. Id. 
297. Id. at 16. 
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that such an action “would not lie where an adequate statutory 
remedy is available but has not been pursued.”298 While the court 
agreed that no claim for tortious interference would lie where 
there is an adequate alternate statutory remedy, it found that the 
circumstances presented in Umsted v. Umsted299 and Henry v. 
Sheffield,300 both of which dismissed claims for the plaintiffs’ 
failure to pursue adequate statutory remedies, were inapplicable 
to Americans United for  two  reasons.301  First,  Americans 
United’s motion to intervene in the Dauray litigation and its 
petition to reopen Mrs. Mee’s estate were denied.302 Thus, 
Americans United did, however unsuccessfully, pursue a 
remedy.303 Furthermore, under Rhode Island General Laws 
Section 33-18-17, allowing a “person legally interested in the 
estate of a deceased person . . . to recover any property, personal  
or real . . . [that] should be recovered for the benefit of the estate,” 
which could have been pursued against the Legion of Christ in 
superior court, did not provide Americans United with an  
adequate remedy, as Americans United was not “legally 
interested,” and, even if it were such action, if successful, would 
ultimately enrich the estate, of which the Legion of Christ was the 
sole beneficiary.304 Second, the court determined that Americans 
United sufficiently pled the elements of tortious interference, 
though it left “for another day a discussion of the precise elements 
required to prove a claim of tortious interference with expectation 
of inheritance.”305 
B. The Future of the Tort in Rhode Island 
1. Viability 
The Rhode Island Superior Court’s recognition of tortious 
interference   with   an   expected   inheritance   sets   a   new legal 
 
 
298. Id. at 17 (quoting Henry v. Sheffield, 856 F. Supp. 2d 345, 350 (D.R.I. 
2012)). 
299. 446 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 2006). 
300. 856 F. Supp. 2d 345, 350 (D.R.I. 2012). 
301. Ams. United for Life, slip op. at 19–21. 
302. Id. at 20. 
303. See id. 
304. Id. at 18 (quoting Umsted v. Umsted, 446 F.3d 17, 23  (1st  Cir. 
2006)). 
305. Id. at 22. 
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precedent in Rhode Island. Whether the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court will agree with the superior court’s decision remains to be 
seen. However, there are several arguments that support 
recognition of the tort in Rhode Island. 
As explained in Part II, supra, many other jurisdictions that 
have considered tortious interference have extended the cause of 
action for tortious interference with contract rights or business 
relations to cover tortious interference with an inheritance or 
gift.306 Rhode Island has long recognized a cause of action for 
tortious interference with contract rights or other business 
relations.307 Both tortious interference with an  expected 
inheritance and other tortious interference claims involve: 1) 
economic loss without physical harm to person or property; 2) a 
claim that is not based on an existing and enforceable right or an 
existing and enforceable contract; and 3) a probable prospect of 
economic gain.308 Thus, Rhode Island already recognizes liability 
for similar tortious conduct.309 Moreover, Rhode Island courts 
frequently look to the Restatement in determining the scope and 
applicability of tort law in the State, which officially recognized  
the tort in 1979.310  Thus, if history is any indicator, other Rhode 
 
306. See, e.g., Allen v. Hall, 974 P.2d 199, 204 (Or. 1999); Cyr v. Cote, 396 
A.2d 1013, 1018 (Me. 1979). 
307. See, e.g., Belliveau Building Corp. v. O’Coin, 763 A.2d 622, 624 (R.I. 
2000); Jolicoeur Furniture Co. v. Baldelli, 653 A.2d 740, 753 (R.I. 1995). 
308. Allen, 974 P.2d at 202; DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §  450 
(2000). 
309. Simply extending the concept of tortious interference to cover 
situations in which a tortfeasor impermissibly interferes with a right to  
inherit does not usurp the powers of the General Assembly. Rhode Island 
courts have previously extended existing causes of action to new contexts. 
See, e.g., Central Falls Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trs. v. Central Falls Teachers Union, 
C.A. No. PC 2014-6275, 2015 R.I. Super. LEXIS 110, at *25 (R.I. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 28, 2015) (extending the principle that public employers cannot divest 
themselves of statutory duties to the educational context); Bibeault v. 
Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313, 317, 319 (R.I. 1980) (With “the absence of a 
legislative intent to the contrary” the Rhode Island Supreme Court extended 
the well-established duty of an insurer in the context of liability insurance to 
act reasonably and in good faith in settling third-party claims against 
insureds to the context of an “insurer’s bad faith refusal to settle  an 
insurance claim . . . .”). 
310. See,  e.g.,  Gushlaw  v.  Milner,  42  A.3d  1245,  1257–58  (R.I.  2012) 
(relying upon the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315); Volpe v. Gallagher, 
821 A.2d 699, 706 (R.I. 2003) (relying upon the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §  318); Clift  v. Narragansett  TV  L.P., 688  A.2d  805, 810  (R.I. 1996) 
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Island judges will likely agree with the Americans United court. 
As the Americans United court pointed out, recognition of 
tortious interference does not undermine Rhode Island’s policy of 
“expeditious and conclusive settlement of estates and quieting of 
titles” as it is an in personam action, completely distinct from a 
will contest or an action under Rhode Island General Laws  
Section 33-18-17 to recover assets for the benefit of the estate.311  
It seeks damages from the defendant, rather than to revoke 
probate of a will or otherwise interfere with probate assets. As the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has 
explained, “[d]espite its entwinement with probate, a cause of 
action for tortious interference with inheritance is one brought in 
personam. It is no different from any other tort—the plaintiff is 
asserting that some tortious action on the part of the defendant 
has caused him or her damage.”312 
The Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District, 
explained that “[t]he legal differences between a will contest and 
[tortious   interference]   are   far-reaching.”313     Indeed, “[u]nlike 
 
(relying upon the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455); Shire Corp. v. R.I. 
Dep’t   of  Transp.,  C.A.  No.  PB   09-5686,  2012   R.I.  Super.  LEXIS   32, at 
*89 (R.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 2, 2012) (relying upon the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 766, 766A which concerns tortious interference with a business 
relationship). 
311. Ams. United for Life v. The Legion of Christ of N. Am., Inc., C.A. No. 
PC-2016-2900, slip op. at 16 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2017) (quoting Umsted v. 
Umsted, 446 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2006)); see Munn v. Briggs, 185 Cal. App. 
4th 578, 586 (Cal. App. 2010) (whereas a probate proceeding determines what 
will happen to the testator’s probate estate, a tort action can result in a 
judgment against the defendant personally). 
312. Golden v. Golden, 382 F.3d 348, 364 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Marshall 
v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 296, 312 (2006) (probate exception inapplicable to 
plaintiff’s claim of tortious interference, as plaintiff was “seek[ing] an in 
personam judgment . . . not the probate or annulment of a will”); Bouchard v. 
Bouchard, 382 A.2d 810, 814 (R.I. 1978) (explaining that in rem jurisdiction   
is jurisdiction over the thing, while in personam jurisdiction is jurisdiction 
over the person); Munn, 185 Cal. App. 4th at 586 (whereas a probate 
proceeding determines what will happen to the testator’s probate estate, a 
tort action can result in a judgment against the defendant personally); Burt 
v. Rhode Island Hosp. Tr., C.A. No. PC/02-2243, 2006 R.I. Super. LEXIS 91,   
at *26 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jul. 26, 2006) (“[T]he damages remedy sought is 
entirely distinct from the probate res, and the plaintiffs’ suit is, therefore, 
cognizable in the Superior Court.”). 
313. Munn, 185 Cal. App. 4th at 586 (quotations omitted) (Tortious 
interference “is not a testator-centered remedy . . . the tort represents a 
fundamental and significant shift of focus away from the testator and onto 
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probate proceedings, which seek to carry out the intent of the 
testator with respect to the distribution of the testator’s estate, a 
tort action for interference with an expected inheritance  
endeavors to restore the plaintiff with the benefit arguably lost 
because of the defendant’s tortious conduct.”314 Moreover, the fact 
that a plaintiff’s damages may be measured, in part, by the 
amount of the inheritance they would have received, but for the 
interference “does not convert [its] tort claims into an action to 
probate a will or administer an estate.”315 In fact,  courts  can 
grant relief, without “challenging the [probate court’s] 
determinations of estate value and testamentary document 
validity, enforceability and distributive scheme.”316 Thus, 
litigation of a claim for tortious interference would not hamper the 
probate process or the settlement of estates. 
2. Exhaustion Requirement 
The Americans United court, following Umsted and Henry,317 
found that “a claim for tortious interference with expectation of 
inheritance is unavailable when an adequate statutory remedy 
was available but not pursued.”318 This “exhaustion” requirement 
appears to be a reconciliation of two competing interests: 1) 
preventing attempts to circumvent the probate court statutes  and 
2) assuring a plaintiff an avenue to redress damages caused by 
tortious conduct.  However, in Rhode Island, such a requirement 
 
the wronged would-be-beneficiary.”) (emphasis added); accord In re Estate of 
Ellis, 923 N.E.2d. 237, 240 (Ill. 2009) (“A tort action for intentional 
interference with inheritance is distinct from a petition to contest the validity 
of a will, in several important respects.”); Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013, 1017 
(Me. 1979) (“[W]e find the distinction between a will case and the instant suit 
significant and . . . conclude that such differences entitled plaintiffs to a jury 
trial. . . .”). 
314. Munn, 185 Cal. App. 4th at 586 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
315. Wellin v. Wellin, No. 2:14-cv-4-67-DCN, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
19488, at *30 (D.S.C. Feb. 12, 2015). 
316. Golden, 382 F.3d at 364; see also Munn, 185 Cal. App. 4th at 586 (“A 
successful tort action results in a judgment against the defendant for money 
damages, not a determination of the validity of a particular will or 
testamentary result.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
317. Umsted v. Umsted, 446 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 2006); Henry v. 
Sheffield, 856 F. Supp. 2d 345, 350 (D.R.I. 2012). 
318. Ams. United for Life v. The Legion of Christ of N. Am., Inc., C.A. No. 
PC-2016-2900, slip op. at 19 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2017) (citing Umsted, 446 
F.3d at 22). 
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is burdensome, highly impractical, and potentially impossible to 
satisfy. 
First, adoption of the probate exhaustion requirement would, 
in many cases, limit victims to the probate court forum, 
contravening well-settled case law that tortious interference may 
be entertained by non-probate courts, based on a logical reading of 
federal authority construing the federal probate exception.319 In 
Marshall v. Marshall (the Anna Nicole Smith litigation), the 
decedent’s widow brought a claim against the decedent’s son 
alleging that the son had tortiously interfered with a gift she 
expected to receive from the decedent.320 The decedent’s  son 
moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction claiming 
that the widow’s claim could only be tried in the Texas probate 
court system.321 The son’s motion was granted and the decedent’s 
widow appealed.322 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court 
noted that many federal courts, citing the probate exception, had 
incorrectly abstained from adjudicating matters that extend “well 
beyond probate of a will or administration of a decedent’s estate,” 
including an executor’s breach of fiduciary duty.323 While the 
probate exception does prevent federal courts from disposing of 
property in the custody of a state probate court, “it does not bar 
federal courts from adjudicating matters outside those  confines 
and otherwise within federal jurisdiction.”324 Importantly, the 
Court stated that “[s]tate probate courts possess no ‘special 
proficiency . . . in handling [such] issues.”325 
 
319. The probate exception has been defined to mean that “a federal court 
has no jurisdiction to probate a will or administer an estate,” hence the 
“exception” to federal court jurisdiction. Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 
(1946). 
320. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 296, 300–01 (2006). 
321. Id. 
322. Id. at 304. 
323. Id. at 311. 
324. Id. at 312. 
325. Id. at 312 (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689,  704 
(1992)). The Marshall Court also classified tortious interference as a 
transitory action. Id. at 313–14. Rhode Island courts have held that a 
transitory action: 
[I]s one that can be brought in any venue where the defendant can  
be personally served with process. Transitory actions are universally 
founded on the supposed violation of rights which, in contemplation 
of the law, have no locality. Thus, a transitory action exists as 
opposed to a local action, which is one that can be brought only in 
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Though the probate exception is a federal doctrine affecting 
federal courts, the Rhode Island Superior Court in Burt v. Rhode 
Island Hospital Trust compared the doctrine to the jurisdiction of 
Rhode Island probate courts.326 In Burt, the plaintiffs filed a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim against the co-executors of the 
decedent’s estate in superior court while estate proceedings in 
probate court were ongoing.327 The Burt court found that the 
plaintiffs’ claim “d[id] not involve the administration of an estate, 
the probate of a will, or any other purely probate matter.”328 
Significantly, the plaintiffs were seeking an in personam  
judgment against the executors, such that the damages sought 
were distinct from the res being administered by the probate 
court.329 
It is thus clear that the Rhode Island Superior Court has the 
jurisdiction and capacity to entertain claims for tortious 
interference. By contrast, Rhode Island probate courts may 
exercise jurisdiction only to the limited extent conferred by statute 
and have very limited equitable powers.330 Specifically, Rhode 
Island probate courts may only follow the course of equity as it 
concerns a trust created by will or a testamentary trust.331 In 
essence, Rhode Island probate courts have the power to  
administer   estates,   not   decide   questions   of   law   or   impose 
 
 
the jurisdiction where the cause of action arose, as when the action’s 
subject matter is a piece of real property. 
Aquidneck Realty, Inc. v. G.P. Pier Retail, LLC, C.A. No. NC-2007-0625, 2008 
R.I. Super. LEXIS 22, at *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2008) (citing BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 34 (8th ed. 2004) (internal citation omitted) (internal quotations 
omitted)). The Marshall Court held that, “a State cannot create a transitory 
cause of action and at the same time destroy the right to sue on that 
transitory cause of action in any court having jurisdiction.” 547 U.S. at 314. 
326. 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 8-9-9 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 542 of the 
Jan.  2016  Sess.);  C.A.  No.  PC/02-2243,  2006  R.I.  Super.  LEXIS  91,  at 
*26 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 26, 2006). 
327. C.A. No. PC/02-2243, 2006 R.I. Super. LEXIS 91, at *9–10. 
328. Id. at *24 (emphasis added) (quoting Marshall, 547 U.S. at 304) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
329. Id. at *25–26. 
330. Id. at *17 ((“[P]robate courts in Rhode Island are courts of limited 
jurisdiction and can ‘exercis[e] jurisdiction only in a manner and to the extent 
conferred by statute’” (alteration in original) (quoting Carr v. Prader, 715   
A.2d 291, 293 (R.I. 1999)). 
331. 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 8-2-13 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 542 of 
the Jan. 2016 Sess.). 
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equitable remedies. Thus, a claim  of tortious interference, which 
is of both an equitable and legal character, is incapable of 
adjudication by the probate court.332 And because the elements 
comprising a claim of tortious interference cannot be adjudicated 
by the Rhode Island probate courts, adoption of the exhaustion 
requirement in Rhode Island would actually impede tort victims’ 
ability to obtain redress for their damages. 
Other nearby states seem to agree. Maine has a probate court 
system similar to that of Rhode Island, making its jurisprudence 
on the exhaustion requirement compelling.333 Recognizing the 
limited jurisdiction of their probate courts and the unavailability 
of jury trials at the probate court level, Maine state courts have 
held that there is no requirement for victims of tortious 
interference to exhaust probate court remedies before bringing 
such a claim in superior court.334 
As described in Part III, in Plimpton v. Gerrard, the plaintiff, 
son of the decedent, brought an action against defendant legatee  
of a will alleging tortious interference with his expectancy, both in 
connection with the inter vivos transfer of his parents’ real estate, 
and in connection with the revision of his father’s will.335 The 
defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims, arguing that the 
plaintiff   had   an   obligation   “to   exhaust   his   Probate   Court 
 
332. See Bosworth v. Bosworth, 167 A. 151, 152 (R.I. 1933) (fraud is “one 
of the principal grounds of equitable jurisdiction.”); Champlin v. Slocum, 103 
A. 706, 708 (R.I. 1918) (the court of probate, which has no equity jurisdiction, 
is not adapted to the investigation and determination of questions of fraud); 
Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013, 1019 (Me. 1979) (undue influence is the means of 
the tortious interference); Paiva v. Paiva, PC 05-3039, 2008 R.I.  Super. 
LEXIS 48, at *21–22 (R.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2008) (undue influence is 
constructive fraud); accord Gee v. Bullock, C.A. No. 96-2223,  1996 WL 
937009, at *2 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 16, 1996) (“Allegations of 
misrepresentation are one of the principal grounds for obtaining equitable 
jurisdiction in Superior Court.”); see generally Burt v. Rhode Island Hosp. Tr., 
C.A. No. PC/02-2243, 2006 R.I. Super. LEXIS 91, at *18 n.9 (R.I. Super. Ct. 
Jul. 26, 2006) (claims of breaches of fiduciary duty, like fraud, are not 
appropriate for resolution by the probate court). 
333. See Voisine v. Tomlinson, 955 A.2d 748, 751 (Me. 2008). Moreover, 
Maine has a significant body of law on the tort. “Nine decisions by Maine’s 
Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) between 1979 and 2000 have clarified the 
elements and scope of the tort in Maine, and several subsequent Superior 
Court cases have further applied it.” Klein, supra note 13, at 252. 
334. Cyr, 396 A.2d at 1017; Plimpton v. Gerrard, 668 A.2d 882, 887 (Me. 
1995). 
335. Plimpton, 668 A.2d at 884. 
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remedies,” both in connection with the inter vivos transfer 
challenge and the plaintiff’s claim relating to the inheritance of  
his father’s estate in probate court.336 The  Supreme  Judicial 
Court of Maine disagreed. Though the  plaintiff  “theoretically 
[had] an adequate remedy in the Probate Court” for his inter vivos 
transfer challenge and inheritance claim, it did “not compel [him] 
to go there to pursue his tortious interference claim.”337 The court 
reasoned that the superior court and the probate court had 
concurrent jurisdiction for a claim of undue influence. “The very 
concept of concurrent jurisdiction is inconsistent with a preference 
for one jurisdiction over another.”338 Moreover, and importantly, 
“[i]n civil cases in which damages are sought, a plaintiff has the 
right to a jury trial.”339 
Connecticut, similarly, limits the jurisdiction of its probate 
courts. Connecticut General Statutes Section 45a-98 defines the 
“[g]eneral powers” of the probate courts, contrasting them with  
the superior courts of “general jurisdiction.”340 Connecticut courts 
recognize that probate courts are limited.341 Importantly, the 
Connecticut Appeals Court has held that counts for “tortious 
interference with the expectation of an inheritance,” among other 
torts, were not within the jurisdiction of the probate court, stating 
that “[n]either [Section] 45a-98 [which sets out the jurisdiction of 
 
 
336. Id. at 886–87. 
337. Id. at 887. 
338. Id. 
339. Id. 
340. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-98 (Westlaw through the 2016 Sept. Spec. 
Sess.). 
341. See Heussner v. Hayes, 961 A.2d 365, 369 (Conn. 2008) (“The Probate 
Court is a court of limited jurisdiction prescribed by statute, and it may 
exercise only such powers as are necessary to the performance of its duties.”); 
Heiser v. Morgan Guar. Tr. Co., 192 A.2d 44, 45 (Conn. 1963) (“It is a familiar 
principle that a court which exercises a limited and statutory jurisdiction is 
without jurisdiction to act unless it does so under the precise circumstances 
and in the manner particularly prescribed by the enabling  legislation. . . . 
Our courts of probate have a limited jurisdiction and can exercise only such 
powers as are conferred on them by statute . . . .”) (emphasis  added); Geremia 
v. Geremia, 125 A.3d 549, 561 (Conn. App. 2015) (“Connecticut law long has 
demarcated the distinction between the jurisdiction of our probate and 
superior courts. Connecticut General Statutes § 51-164s provides in relevant 
part that ‘[t]he Superior Court shall be the sole court of original jurisdiction 
for all causes of action, except such actions over which the courts of probate 
have original jurisdiction, as provided by statute. . . .’”). 
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the probate court] nor any other provision of the General Statutes 
vests the Probate Court with jurisdiction, exclusive or otherwise, 
over those actions sounding in tort.”342 
Other states with probate courts jurisdictionally unable to 
entertain a claim for money damages arising for allegations of 
fraud hold that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to pursue 
remedies there prior to filing a suit in the trial  courts.343  In 
Widdig v. Watkins, the daughter of a decedent filed claims for civil 
fraud, undue influence, and tortious interference against her niece 
and nephew.344 The trial court granted the niece and nephew’s 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding 
that the daughter had an obligation to exhaust her probate court 
remedies. Reversing, the appellate court explained that a 
threshold issue is “whether appellant had an appropriate 
procedure available in probate court to redress her claims . . . .”345 
Explaining that the probate court “is a court of limited and special 
jurisdiction,” the court upheld the daughter’s claims, brought in 
her individual capacity, as “generally speaking, the probate 
division has no jurisdiction over claims for money damages arising 
from allegations of fraud.”346 Thus, the  daughter  had  no 
obligation to pursue probate court remedies before filing her 
claims in the trial court.347 
Though New Hampshire has not yet recognized tortious 
interference, its case law indicates that if it did, probate 
exhaustion would not be a prerequisite to maintaining a suit in 
 
342. Geremia, 125 A.3d at 561. 
343. See, e.g., Widdig v. Watkins, No. 13-CA-3531, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 
4015, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2013). 
344. Id. at *1–2. 
345. Id. at *5. 
346. Id. at *8. 
347. Id.; see also Huffey v. Lea, 491 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Iowa 1991) (“[W]e 
do not believe the same evidence supports the will contest and the action for 
intentional interference with a bequest. Further, we agree with plaintiffs that 
a complete remedy could not be provided in the will contest because of the 
additional costs involved in the appeals process.”); Allen v. Hall, 974 P.2d   
199, 204 (Or. 1999) (“A tort claim does not become a will contest simply 
because it arises out of facts relating to the making or unmaking of a will.”); 
Butcher v. McClain, 260 P.2d 611, 616 (Or. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Allen and 
concluding plaintiff was not required to bring claim in probate court  to  
pursue tort); Barone v. Barone, 294 S.E. 260, 264 (W. Va. 1982) (“We find 
tortious interference with a testamentary bequest to be a tort in West 
Virginia. This tort is not within probate court jurisdiction . . . .”). 
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the superior court. Similar to Rhode Island, the New Hampshire 
probate courts are “not [ ] court[s] of general jurisdiction. [Their] 
powers are limited to those conferred upon [them] by statute.”348 
In In re CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire stated that, in enacting the Omnibus Justice Act, the 
legislature “did not intend to force a party entitled to a jury trial  
in superior court to first subject itself to a trial before a probate 
court judge and then to appeal an adverse decision to the superior 
court for jury trial.”349 Specifically, the “statutory provision that 
the superior court will take ‘cognizance’ of matters in the probate 
court for which there is a right to trial by jury did not deprive 
litigants of the right to apply for relief in superior court without 
first applying for the same relief in the probate court.”350 
States that have adopted the exhaustion requirement, on the 
other hand, have probate court systems that are much better 
suited to adjudication of a tort such as tortious interference. For 
instance, Massachusetts, which espouses the exhaustion 
requirement, has probate “courts of general equity jurisdiction,” 
which sit full-time.351 Furthermore, Massachusetts General Laws 
chapter 215, Section 2, provides that Massachusetts probate  
courts are courts of “superior and general jurisdiction.”352 Thus, it 
is possible for the Massachusetts probate courts to adjudicate 
claims of tortious interference, making circumvention of the 
probate court procedures a legitimate concern. 
As is clear, Rhode Island probate courts are ill equipped, and 
more importantly lack the necessary jurisdiction, to adjudicate a 
claim for tortious interference. However, there is another 
compelling rationale for rejection of an exhaustion requirement: 
the practical limitations of the Rhode Island probate court system 
itself. There are thirty-nine probate courts in Rhode Island—one 
for each  town  or city.353   Probate judges sit part-time  and  often 
 
348. In re Estate of O’Dwyer, 605, A.2d 216, 217 (N.H. 1992). 
349. 177 A.2d 884, 890 (N.H. 2001). 
350. Id. 
351. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 215, § 6 (Westlaw through Ch.1 of the 2017 1st 
Annual Sess.). 
352. Id. § 2. 
353. See Probate Courts: State Links, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Special-Jurisdiction/Probate-Courts/State-Links. 
aspx#Rhode Island (last visited Mar. 17, 2017). Many of these courts meet 
only    once    per    month.    See    Rhode    Island    Probate    Court    Update, 
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maintain private law practices. Moreover, while the Rhode Island 
Rules of Civil Procedure are self-executing in  superior  court, in 
the probate courts parties must petition, pursuant to Rhode Island 
General Laws Sections 8-9-17 and 9-18-12, for the use of specific 
discovery to obtain information from the opposing party.354 A 
probate court may then exercise its discretion and “limit the scope 
of discovery to what is relevant to the contested issue before it and 
may shorten or enlarge deadlines for compliance as circumstances 
warrant.”355 With respect to hearings, probate courts may choose 
whether to apply the Rhode Island Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
the parties can decide jointly whether to apply the Rhode Island 
Rules of Evidence.356 Decisions are always rendered by a probate 
court judge, never a jury, and parties advancing in age do not have 
the benefit of acceleration of civil actions in cases where a 
“plaintiff or defendant has attained the age of sixty-five (65) 
years.”357 
A claim of tortious interference involves allegations of undue 
influence, fraud or duress, and oftentimes is proven by 
circumstantial evidence, as “the perpetrator of  such  covert 
coercion generally applies the forbidden pressure in secret.”358 
Discovering such indirect evidence would be an awkward and 
clumsy task in probate court, where use of discovery devices is not 
automatic, and petitioning for discovery may involve waiting a 
month until the court next meets. Moreover, whether one has  
been unduly influenced or defrauded is frequently a fact-intensive 
inquiry that is more appropriate for resolution by a jury, rather 
than a judge. Because the circumstantial evidence likely involves 
out of court statements, it is imperative that the rules of evidence 
apply. For these and other reasons, the Rhode Island probate 
court system is an inappropriate forum to bring a claim of tortious 
 
 
PROVIDENCERI.COM, http://www.providenceri.com/efile/620 (last visited Mar. 
4, 2017). 
354. 8 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 8-9-17 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 542 of 
the Jan. 2016 Sess.); 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-18-12 (West, Westlaw through 
Ch. 542 of the Jan. 2016 Sess.). 
355. 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-22-19.2(c) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 
542 of the Jan. 2016 Sess.). 
356. Id. 
357. 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-2-18 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 542 of 
the Jan. 2016 Sess.). 
358. Caranci v. Howard, 708 A.2d 1321, 1324 (R.I. 1998). 
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interference. 
An understanding of the limited jurisdiction and functionality 
of the probate court system in Rhode Island demonstrates that 
concerns about circumvention of the probate court statutes are not 
implicated by rejection of the exhaustion requirement. Indeed, 
there is no real ability to litigate a claim of tortious interference in 
the Rhode Island probate courts, rendering an exhaustion 
requirement meaningless and, potentially, fatal to a tort victim’s 
ability to obtain constitutionally guaranteed relief.  Thus,  
whatever the force of arguments in favor of exhaustion as 
necessary prior step to bringing a claim of tortious interference, 
the practical effects of such a requirement in Rhode Island must 
be carefully weighed, considered, and given context. These  
authors believe that the potential benefits of such a requirement  
in Rhode Island are far outweighed by the risk of closing the 
courthouse doors to victims of the tort. 
CONCLUSION 
Decades of case law illustrate that courts recognize the need  
to fill the vacuum left by the inadequacy of probate court 
procedures by extending the common-law claim for tortious 
interference with a business relation or contract to the context of 
inheritance law. The Rhode Island Superior Court’s decision in 
Americans United for Life v. Legion of Christ of North America, 
Inc. aligns Rhode Island with several states, including nearby 
Maine, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, and, by threatening to 
penalize wrongdoing, promises to deter those who would attempt 
to tortiously interfere with a testator’s intentions. Americans 
United, therefore, represents a significant victory for the Rhode 
Island population vulnerable to undue influence and fraud and for 
third parties who have been thereby deprived of their inheritance. 
